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INTRODUCTION
The subject of constitutional historicism is best introduced by means of a
thought experiment that contrasts the past with the present. Consider first a
fictional table of citations in which the present rules the past:
TABLE 1
The Present as the Past—Frontloading Constitutional History
Actual Case Title
Brandenburg v. Ohio
Brown v. Bd. of Educ.
Frontiero v.
Richardson

Fictional Citation
15 Fed. Cas. 1183 (1798)
163 U.S. 537 (1896)
83 U.S. 130 (1873)

Actual Citation
395 U.S. 444 (1969)
347 U.S. 483 (1954)
411 U.S. 677 (1973)

Brandenburg decided in 1798? Had the Brandenburg rule been
established then, the Supreme Court almost surely would have been unable
to avoid the question of the Sedition Act’s constitutionality.1 Brown an
1896 case? In the fictional table above, it has been given Plessy’s citation,
thus suggesting an earlier end to American apartheid.2 And Frontiero
decided in 1873? Frontiero rejected stereotypes about women exactly a
1. Lower court opinions of the time sidestepped the issue of the Sedition Act’s
constitutionality. See United States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 631, 639-43 (D. Pa. 1800) (No.
14,865) (focusing on the intentions of Copper’s actions and not the constitutionality of the
law); United States v. Lyon, 15 F. Cas. 1183, 1185 (D. Vt. 1798) (No. 8,646) (instructing
the jury to ignore any questions of constitutionality and focus only on whether Lyon
seditiously published the writing in question). During the course of his opinion for the
Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), Justice Brennan made the
historicist point that “[a]lthough the Sedition was never tested in this Court, the attack upon
its validity has carried the day in the court of history.” Id. at 276.
2. The Court’s conclusion in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303(1879), that the
exclusion of African-Americans from service on petit juries violates the equal protection
clause signaled what might have been the end of legally mandated segregation. Id. at 312.
However, numerous cases decided in the next three decades, of which Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896), is the most prominent, made clear that Strauder was not the prelude to
an end to racial segregation.
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century after Bradwell endorsed them.3
Would America have been a better country if this first table were fact
rather than fiction? If we indict the past from the standpoint of the present,
this seems undeniably true. Certainly the reverse—a backloaded table—
reminds us how disturbing the present would be if constitutional doctrine
had not been altered. Thus imagine the following:
TABLE 2
The Past as the Present—Backloading Constitutional History
Actual Case Title
U.S. v. Matthew Lyon
Plessy v. Ferguson
Bradwell v. Illinois

Fictional Citation
395 U.S. 444 (1969)
347 U.S. 483 (1954)
411 U.S. 677 (1973)

Actual Citation
15 Fed. Cas. 1183 (1798)
163 U.S. 537 (1896)
83 U.S. 130 (1873)

Here, history is a nightmare from which we have yet to awaken.4 The
refusal of late eighteenth century federal judges to uphold rights of political
dissent persists to this day. Plessy’s separate but equal rule governs race
relations. Bradwell’s exaltation of female delicacy continues to define the
constitutional law of gender discrimination. Arguably, judicial failure to
modify doctrine—and this of course assumes a constitutional tradition at
odds with the one we actually have—would have invited legislative and
executive initiative. Thomas Jefferson, for example, pardoned those
convicted under the Sedition Act and then let it lapse;5 many northern
states rejected Plessy’s view of race relations long before Brown was
decided.6 But the opposite might also be true. Absent leadership from the
3. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-85 (1973) (stating the plurality’s
argument that “gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes” sustained America’s “long
and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.”); Bradwell v. The State, 83 U.S. 130, 141
(1873) (holding that it is not one of the privileges and immunities protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment for someone to be free to practice law after meeting a state’s
entrance requirements for the bar).
4. “‘History,’ Stephen [Daedalus] said, ‘is a nightmare from which I am trying to
awake.’” JAMES JOYCE, ULYSSES 34 (Vintage 1922).
5. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 276 (reporting that Jefferson discharged those convicted
under the sedition law because he considered it to be a nullity). The court added that there
was a consensus that the Sedition Act was inconsistent with the First Amendment due to the
restraint it imposed on criticism of the government. Id.; see also JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN
SPHINX: THE CHARACTER OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 187 (1997) (explaining that Jefferson was
able to take these actions since the legislation that created the Alien and Sedition Acts
lapsed early in his presidency, and he had congressional support since the Republicans had a
large majority in the House and a small majority in the Senate).
6. Indeed, at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, thirteen states
prohibited racial segregation in public schools. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE
HISTORY OF Brown v. Board of Education AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY
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Court—leadership that of course is routinely challenged by coordinate
branches of government,7 for the Court’s decisions are rarely implemented
on a command and control basis8—it is quite possible that America would
be a fundamentally different country today. At the very least, it seems
reasonable to suppose that some states would have held out for a
substantial period of time against the rules announced in Brown and
Frontiero.
To most professional historians, these “might-have-beens” do not
provide a promising mode of inquiry.9 Historians contextualize Supreme
Court decisions in the same way they examine religious practices,10
methods of childrearing,11 handbooks of etiquette,12 and even the notion of
sexual deviance.13 Professional history, on this account of current practice,
can best be understood as retrospective cultural anthropology.14 The
633 (1976).
7. A notable instance of such a challenge is to be found in Andrew Jackson’s approach
to Supreme Court decisions upholding the rights of Native American tribes. In the wake of
the Court’s decision in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), which held
Georgia’s anti-Cherokee statutes unconstitutional, id. at 595-96, President Jackson
remarked: “John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it.” LEONARD
BAKER, JOHN MARSHALL: A LIFE IN LAW 745 (1974). Moreover, in vetoing congressional
legislation renewing the charter of the Bank of the United States, President Jackson asserted
that “[t]he opinion of the judges has no more authority over Congress than the opinion of
Congress over judges, and on that point the President is independent of both.” Andrew
Jackson, Veto Message of July 10, 1832, in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS
OF THE PRESIDENTS 576, 582 (James Richardson ed., 1897).
8. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 6 (1978)
(noting that as far as school desegregation is concerned, Justice Frankfurter worried during
oral argument in Brown that “[n]othing could be worse from my point of view than for this
Court to make an abstract declaration that segregation is bad and then have it evaded by
tricks”); see also WILLIAM KER MUIR, The Setting, in PRAYER IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS: LAW
AND ATTITUDE CHANGE 11, 15 (1967) (discussing school prayer cases and drawing a
distinction between patriotic exercises and practices of worship) (on file with the American
University Law Review).
9. See, e.g., JOSEPH J. ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION
105 (2000) (“Though we might wish otherwise, the history of what might have been is not
really history at all, mixing together as it does the messy tangle of past experience with the
clairvoyant certainty of our present preferences.”).
10. See, e.g., ALEXIS MCCROSSEN, HOLY DAY, HOLIDAY: THE AMERICAN SUNDAY
(2000) (stating that the purpose of the book is to provide the history of a Sunday during the
nineteenth century).
11. See, e.g., STEVEN MINTZ, HUCK’S RAFT: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CHILDHOOD
(2004) (describing methods and philosophies of child-rearing for various times and cultures,
including Puritans, Eastern Indians, colonial Chesapeake, post-Revolutionary, Evangelical,
scientific, during the 1950s, and among urban poor).
12. See, e.g., NORBERT ELIAS, THE CIVILIZING PROCESS: THE HISTORY OF MANNERS
(Edmund Jephcott trans., 1978) (including chapters on behavior at the table, blowing one’s
nose, spitting, and behavior in the bedroom).
13. See, e.g., CAROL GRONEMAN, NYMPHOMANIA: A HISTORY (2000) (recounting
stories of women diagnosed with nymphomania from as far back as 1841). Groneman notes
that behavior diagnosed as nymphomaniacal as recently as thirty years ago is now viewed as
commonplace. Id. at 181.
14. See, e.g., CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, THE SAVAGE MIND 256 (1966) (comparing history
and anthropology and explaining that the “historian strives to reconstruct the picture of
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historical method requires its practitioners to identify the mentalities15 (to
use Marc Bloch’s evocative term) and discursive contexts16 (to use a term
from contemporary practice) characteristic of a certain time and account for
a given activity in light of what has been identified. Historians of
constitutional law have used this approach in trying to understand past
doctrine. For example, they have considered the Alien and Sedition Acts
not in terms of current premises but in terms of attitudes and legal norms
prevailing in the late eighteenth century.17 Given this approach, Supreme
Court decisions from the distant past can be viewed as period pieces. The
rules they announce and the justifications they advance are understandable
in terms of a larger framework of values that has (at least partially)
disappeared but that can be recaptured through the imaginative empathy
central to historical inquiry.18
We can give the label “contextual historicism” to this search for
historically-specific mentalities. What distinguishes the practice of modern
historians—with Voltaire treated as pre-modern on this account,19 Ranke as
among the earliest of the moderns,20 and Dilthey as the theorist who laid
vanished societies as they were at the points which for they correspond to the present, while
the ethnographer does his best to reconstruct the historical stages which temporally preceded
their existing form.”).
15. See CAROLE FINK, MARC BLOCH: A LIFE IN HISTORY 111-12 (1989) (describing
how Bloch strove to discount the errors introduced into history by prejudice, fear, or other
strong emotions).
16. See William W. Fisher, Texts and Contexts: The Application to American Legal
History of the Methodologies of Intellectual History, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1065, 1068
(1997)(explaining that when historians write using the historical method, they mainly write
about language and belief systems).
17. See, e.g., JOHN C. MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS 93
(1951) (stating that the Federalist press believed that the Alien and Sedition Laws were
necessary for that nation’s safety); JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM’S FETTERS: THE ALIEN
AND SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 94 (1956) (explaining that the
Naturalization and Aliens Friends Law represented an increasing distrust of all people in
general and not only of Aliens).
18. See Fisher, supra note 16, at 1097-98 (explaining that, while the legality of abortion
is now a hot debate, an examination of what people believed in the early nineteenth century,
that a fetus was not a person before “quickening,” makes it easier to understand why there
was no call for criminalization of early stages abortion at that time). Fisher writes that,
“[history] can expand readers’ awareness of alternatives simply by revealing that people in
the past lived and thought in fundamentally different ways.” Id. at 1097.
19. In emphasizing the essential invariability of human experience, Voltaire remarks
that “[a]ll history . . . is little else than a long succession of useless cruelties . . . . [It] is a
collection of crimes, follies, and misfortunes, among which we have now and then met with
a few virtues, and some happy times . . . .” FRANCOIS VOLTAIRE, Essay on the Manners and
Spirits of Nations, in THE PORTABLE VOLTAIRE 547, 549 (Ben Ray Redman ed., 1949).
20. See LEOPOLD VON RANKE, Preface to Histories of the Latin and Germanic Nations
From 1494 to 1514, in THE VARIETIES OF HISTORY 55, 55-58 (Fritz Stern ed., 1973) (“To
history has been assigned the office of judging the past, of instructing the present for the
benefit of future ages.”). Recent scholarship has established the extent to which Ranke’s
famous injunction to historians (to show only what actually happened [wie es eigentlich
gewesen ist]) was mistakenly given a positivist gloss by the late nineteenth and early
twentieth American historians who founded the profession in this country. DOROTHY ROSS,
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the foundation for contemporary historical practice21—is an interest in
change and an emphasis on the variability of human experience.
Contextual historicism does not offer explanations for events along the
lines employed by natural scientists when accounting for chemical
syntheses or nuclear fission. Rather, its aim is to interpret behavior—to
“read” it—and so to make sense of past experience. To do this properly,
one must avoid offering a presentist account of the past.22 It is for this
reason that neither of the tables mentioned earlier would be of much
interest to professional historians. The first table is grounded in a brazen
presentism: the past has been uprooted in favor of the present. The second
is also uninteresting. It abolishes the gap separating the past from the
present: it makes the present a footnote to the past.
There is, however, another sense in which the term “historicism”23 is
relevant to both tables. Normative historicism, as we can call this latter
approach, accords prescriptive force to the fact of historical change—that
is, it employs a transhistorical moral principle which assigns value to the
trajectory that links past customs and beliefs to present ones.24 Strong
versions of normative historicism employ few or no other transhistorical
principles.25 These strong versions focus largely, or even exclusively, on
On the Misunderstanding of Ranke and the Origins of the Historical Profession in America,
in LEOPOLD VON RANKE AND THE SHAPING OF THE HISTORICAL DISCIPLINE 154, 154-69
(Georg Iggers & James Powell eds., 1990).
21. See WILHELM DILTHEY, PATTERN AND MEANING IN HISTORY: THOUGHTS ON
HISTORY AND SOCIETY 20 (H.P. Rickman ed., 1962) (referring to a common description of
Dilthey as the forerunner of more recent thinkers and historicism).
22. See, e.g., HERBERT BUTTERFIELD, THE WHIG INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY (1931)
(providing an influential critique of presentism in the study of history). Butterfield
maintains that “the chief aim of the historian [should be] the elucidation of the unlikeness
between past and present . . . .” Id. at 10.
23. In recent years, the term “historicism” has been used by scholars in both normative
and descriptive senses. Stephen Griffin, Constitutional Theory Transformed, 108 YALE L.J.
2115, 2116 (1999) (reasoning in an explicitly normative vein in speaking of “a historicist
constitutional theory” in which “the theory of constitutional change is prior to the task of
constitutional interpretation”). But see Jack Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Legal Historicism
and Legal Academics: The Roles of Law Professors in the Wake of Bush v. Gore, 90 GEO.
L.J. 173, 174 (2001) (using the term descriptively, but in a way that has distinct normative
implications and maintaining that legal historicism believes that the notions of a good or bad
legal argument change over time); G. Edward White, The Arrival of History in
Constitutional Scholarship, 88 VA. L. REV. 485, 522 (2002) (using the term in a purely
descriptive sense and speaking of a “model of historicist constitutional interpretation [that]
challenged and eventually displaced the prehistoricist-inspired model of constitutional
adaptivity”).
24. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 23, at 174 (stating that “historical forces”
influence current legal norms and shape the boundaries of what people view as good or bad
legal arguments and claims).
25. See, e.g., FREDERIC JAMESON, THE POLITICAL UNCONSCIOUS: NARRATIVE AS A
SOCIALLY SYMBOLIC ACT 9 (1981) (asserting “the absolute and we may even say
‘transhistorical’ imperative of all dialectical thought—Always historicize!”). Jameson, it
must be emphasized, is discussing only epistemological problems associated with analysis
of a text. “Always historicize,” however, can be viewed as a transhistorical moral principle
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the trend-line connecting past and present; in doing so, they mandate the
adoption of rules consistent with historical trends. Weaker versions draw
on substantive transhistorical principles as well. That is, weaker versions
also follow the injunction to consider changed patterns of behavior in the
formulation of rules, but because they adopt substantive transhistorical
principles as well (a commitment to personal freedom, for example), these
weaker versions can be said to give new meaning to substantive principles
in light of changed circumstances. The concept of a tradition is
understandable in these terms.26 In considering a tradition, one seeks to
isolate the substantive transhistorical principle that informs it and then to
identify the elements that have changed in light of new circumstances.
Constitutional historicism can be understood as a weak, rather than a
strong, version of normative historicism. It is grounded in the historicist
prescription to take seriously changes in the social and political practices of
the American people. However, it also draws on transhistorical principles
of political theory established by the Constitution’s creators. As an
empirical matter, a historicist would contend, the American constitutional
tradition is best understood in terms of the interplay of historical change
and enduring principles articulated in the text. As a normative matter,
constitutional historicism maintains that the tradition properly developed
along these lines. The most succinct expression of normative constitutional
historicism can be found in Justice Holmes’s opinion of the Court in
Missouri v. Holland.27 At stake in the case was the relevance of the Tenth
Amendment28 to an international treaty concerning migratory birds.
Holmes’s remarks, however, have an unmistakable significance beyond
such specific concerns:
[W]hen we are dealing with words that are also a constituent act, like the
Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have called
into life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen
completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to
realize or to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a
century and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to prove that
they created a nation. The case before us must be considered in the light
of our whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a
hundred years ago . . . . We must consider what this country has

along the lines mentioned above. I am not, of course, suggesting that this is Jameson’s
position.
26. See OWEN CHADWICK, FROM BOSSUET TO NEWMAN xvi (2d ed. 1987) (explaining
that in Latin, the word “tradition” means the act of handing down).
27. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
28. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.”).
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become in deciding what [the Tenth Amendment] has reserved.29

Although many justices of the early and mid-twentieth century—among
them, Justices Cardozo,30 Frankfurter,31 and Harlan32—endorsed some form
of constitutional historicism, this mode of analysis has been employed only
implicitly in most current Court opinions. There has, however, been one
conspicuous exception to this trend. For half a century, the Court has
declared that the Eighth Amendment’s “cruel and unusual punishments”
clause33 should not be understood in terms of the meaning ascribed to it in
the eighteenth century but that it instead should be interpreted in light of
“the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.”34 The evolving standards test can be understood, then, as an
instance of explicit normative constitutional historicism. It treats the
ratifiers’ prohibition of cruel punishment as a transhistorically valid
substantive principle but assumes that the scope of this principle should be
given wider range in light of changing ideas about justified punishment.
The evolving standards test is also of interest because it has provoked a
strong counterattack from two members of the Court: Justices Scalia and
Thomas. Justice Scalia in particular has challenged the test by advancing
an originalist analysis of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
[hereinafter “Punishments Clause”].35 That is, Justice Scalia has, as a
historical matter, sought to identify the precise scope accorded the clause
by the founding generation. Furthermore, he has argued, as a matter of
normative constitutional interpretation, that this scope (and no more) is
what the Court should accord the clause when applying it to concrete cases.
Because historicism and originalism are so often invoked in judicial
debates about the Eighth Amendment, the tension between them is
particularly worth examining with care.
In this Article, I advance a qualified defense of the historicist premises
underlying the evolving standards test. In doing so, I treat the test as a
29. Holland, 252 U.S. at 433-34.
30. See BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 82-83 (1921)
(asserting that notions of constitutional immunity change over time); see also Home Bldg. &
Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (explaining that the founding fathers could not
have known the changes that would occur over time, and beliefs need to be adjusted to the
current time).
31. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169-70 (1952) (stating that when a word or
term in the Constitution does not have a rigid meaning the judgment regarding it will vary in
different times and through different judges).
32. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (explaining
that decisions of the Court regarding the Constitution may vary over time, although they
must build on the traditions of the past and may not radically depart from past traditions).
33. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (providing that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted”).
34. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); see infra notes 106-113 and accompanying
text.
35. See infra notes 70-81 and accompanying text.
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model for historicist jurisprudence in general. Many different interpretive
methods have been proposed as alternatives to constitutional originalism.
The historicist method best captures the premises of the evolving standards
test; moreover, when the unique features of that test are set aside, the
concept of constitutional historicism can be seen more generally to provide
a cogent alternative to originalism. Other alternatives are less satisfactory
on this score. Advocates of the concept of a “living constitution,” for
example, reason in terms of a body of constantly remade constitutional
doctrine36—surely an unhelpful approach given the continuity and stability
characteristic of most areas of constitutional law. The notion of
To endorse
“noninterpretivism”37 is even less promising.
“noninterpretivism” is to imply that judges may properly evade an essential
part of their role: that they may refrain from interpreting the text. The
term “constitutional historicism,” by contrast, focuses attention on the way
in which textual interpretation should be informed by consideration of
enduring trends in the country’s history. Indeed, the method associated
with the term is satisfactory on a number of other counts: it affirms the
subtle links between present and past, it signals the importance of textual
interpretation informed by original values, yet it also emphasizes the way
in which understandings of the text can properly be shaped by changes in
the national experience.
This Article is divided into four parts. The first establishes the
possibility of the historicist method by considering the Court’s Eighth
36. See, e.g., HOWARD LEE MCBAIN, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION: A CONSIDERATION OF
REALITIES AND LEGENDS OF OUR FUNDAMENTAL LAW 33 (1927) (comparing a living
constitution to a living skin; both are elastic, “expansile,” and constantly renewed); Terrance
Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1039 (1981) (advancing
the central tenet of the term living constitution when claiming that constitutional law gives
expression to current values, rather than past values).
37. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 1
(1980) (defining noninterpretivism as the view that, “courts should go beyond that set of
references and enforce norms that cannot be discovered within the four corners of the
document”). The term “common law constitutional interpretation,” it should be noted, is
considerably more promising than either “living constitution” or “noninterpretivism.” See
David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle, 112 YALE
L.J. 1717, 1720 (2003) (describing the need for a common law interpretation while stressing
the importance of adhering to the original understanding of the Constitution); David A.
Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 878-79 (1996)
(finding textualism and originalism to be inadequate, and concluding that a common law
approach, evolving over time, best explains constitutional law). Professor Strauss’s
terminology promisingly implies that constitutional doctrine is, and should be, subject to
incremental growth in much the same way that tort and contract law have been modified
during the past three hundred years. But, of course, the term “common law” also suggests a
fundamental difficulty. The common law was developed by judges in the absence of an
authoritative text. The Constitution, on the other hand, is understood to be just such a text.
Indeed, the problem of vagueness arises precisely because the text is accorded such great
respect yet yields such meager answers by way of guidance. While not quite producing a
paradox, the terms “common law” and “constitution” should not be treated as the starting
point for developing a systematic alternative to originalism.
THE
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Amendment jurisprudence. This method is best understood as an
interpretive response to chronically vague provisions of the constitutional
text. Rather than read the Constitution in light of the referential intentions
of its ratifiers, the historicist propounds its meaning by considering the
connection between the ratifiers’ values and those of the present. The
Punishments Clause provides a particularly helpful way of thinking about
this interpretive method. Modern judicial interpretation of the clause posits
a connection between past and present that enlarges on the ratifiers’
values—that incorporates eighteenth century notions of cruelty but expands
on these by including subsequent changes in sentiments about punishment.
Enlargement on the ratifiers’ values is not the only possible type of
historicism. However, it is certainly the most straightforward and so
provides a starting point for analysis. A parallel trend toward enlargement
is discernible in the interpretation of numerous other provisions: in the
Fourth Amendment’s application to privacy,38 the Sixth Amendment’s
expansion to include the right to appointed counsel for the indigent,39 and
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause40 as applied to
gender discrimination.41 These all stand as instances of the Whig notion of
social development: of “evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.”42
The second part builds on the first by noting how Punishments Clause
decisions provide a model for constitutional historicism in general. In this
section, I examine not only historicism’s commitment to doctrinal change
but also the distinction between enlargement, contraction, and
transformation of constitutional doctrine. In applying this distinction, I
consider the historicist commitment to a time-bound conception of
individual rights and government powers. I also examine the extent to
which courts have been candid when employing a historicist interpretation
38. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.”).
39. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing that the accused must have counsel in all
criminal prosecutions); see also infra notes 43-44 (discussing cases dealing with the Sixth
Amendment).
40. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (mandating that States provide equal protection to
all persons under their laws).
41. See Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 455 (1981) (concluding that gender based
discrimination is unconstitutional unless the government can show that its actions
substantially further an important governmental interest); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S.
380, 388 (1979) (same).
42. This quote has appeared in Supreme Court cases dealing with the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment in regards to the question of
whether the death penalty is appropriate for persons under the age of sixteen. Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 815 (1988); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
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of the text. On this point, as elsewhere, I maintain that the Court’s
interpretation of the Punishments Clause provides a useful guide to
understanding a more general phenomenon. The Court has been notably
frank in its analysis of the doctrinal changes at work in its Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence. I suggest that a similar frankness is possible
for judicial interpretation of other chronically vague provisions of the
Constitution.
The third part ventures beyond the Eighth Amendment by considering
two other clauses whose interpretation can properly be classified as
historicist. My aim in this part of the section is to show that one cannot
make sense of seminal cases such as Johnson v. Zerbst43 and Gideon v.
Wainwright44 without a historicist guide. The latter part of the section
examines recent substantive due process cases, in particular Lawrence v.
Texas.45 The Court’s opinion in Lawrence is marked by a candor that is
missing in the assistance of counsel cases. I consider Lawrence not simply
because of this issue, but also because it underscores the extent to which
the Court has participated in a momentous transformation of constitutional
values a reordering in which privacy and private life have been given
primacy as the key values of civil society. Property rights were treated as
central to an understanding of civil society at the time of the framing.
Lawrence is emblematic of a metamorphosis of values that is different
from, yet understandable in light of, the enlargement characteristic of cases
decided under the Punishments Clause.
The final part considers the legitimacy of historicism as a framework for
interpreting the Constitution. In advancing a qualified defense for its
legitimacy, I emphasize the special sense in which the Constitution
functions as law. Its power to secure consent depends particularly on the
way in which its general terms can be applied in a temporally-specific
fashion and so be understood in light of an ongoing national narrative. The
judiciary performs its function properly when it employs the Constitution’s
chronically vague terms in a temporally appropriate way that links them to
a narrative of national change. Two cheers for constitutional historicism, I
thus argue. It merits one more cheer than originalism, its chief rival, but—
given the defects I note during the course of the Article—three cheers
would be excessive.

43. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). The issue in Johnson is the Sixth Amendment right to
assistance of counsel in criminal prosecutions. Id. at 459.
44. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Gideon holds that even an indigent defendant in a criminal
trial has a fundamental right to assistance of counsel. Id. at 344-45.
45. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). The Court in Lawrence held that a Texas statute criminalizing
certain sexual conduct between two persons of the same sex violated the Due Process
Clause. Id. at 564-79.
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THE POSSIBILITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORICISM: JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION OF THE PUNISHMENTS CLAUSE

America, the first new nation,46 has an old constitution.47 Because the
country has an old written constitution, courts are routinely confronted with
the challenge of applying provisions enacted in a distant past to problems
that arise in a substantially different present. This challenge sometimes
arises because the terms of the Constitution are archaic: think, for
example, about Article I’s provision for “letters of marque and reprisal.”48
On other occasions, however, the challenge arises because terms that were
vague when adopted remain so today. In this section, I use the
Punishments Clause to consider the interpretive options open to courts
when confronted with vague, though far from archaic, language. In
concentrating on originalism and historicism, I treat each as an interpretive
response to the chronic vagueness of general provisions contained in the
Constitution.
A. An Overview of Options for Interpreting the Punishments Clause
To focus on judicial application of old provisions to contemporary
problems is to acknowledge a basic feature of constitutional interpretation:
that it is a text-based practice which takes the words of the document as the
starting point for analysis. Why courts should start with the text is an
important question, one I address later. It is enough to note here that they
routinely do so, not only in Eighth Amendment cases but in others as well.
Thus the significance of the Court’s “we begin with [the] text” in City of
Boerne v. Flores,49 of its appeal to the text in Vernonia School District v.
Acton (“The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides . . . .”),50 and of its opening sentence in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton (“The Constitution sets forth qualifications for membership in the
Congress of the United States . . . .”).51 The meaning ascribed to many of
46. See SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, THE FIRST NEW NATION: THE UNITED STATES IN
HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 15 (1963) (asserting that the United States
claims the title of the first new nation because it was the first major colony to gain
independence from colonial rule).
47. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR’S UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER 105 (2004) (“The American
Constitution is the oldest in force in the world.”). The American Constitution is perhaps the
oldest written one still in force for an entire nation, but unless one argues that Great Britain
has had different constitutions in different eras (a seventeenth century constitution, an
eighteenth century one, and so on), our Constitution cannot be classified as the oldest one in
force in the world.
48. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (authorizing Congress to hold the power to grant
Letters of Marque and Reprisal).
49. 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).
50. 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995).
51. 514 U.S. 779, 782 (1995).
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the words contained in the text may have varied over time, but recourse to
the text as the starting point for analysis is an historical constant in
constitutional interpretation.
How much is settled by an opening move that invokes the text? In some
cases, a good deal. For example, if a court were confronted with a case in
which someone under thirty-five were elected president or in which a new
Congress convened on January 2nd, an appeal to the text would almost
certainly settle matters. Article II’s reference to “thirty five Years”52 was
readily applicable in 1788; it remains applicable under unchanged
standards today. The same can be said of the Twentieth Amendment’s date
for convening Congress.53 The Gregorian calendar remains in use. Clocks
operate under principles established long before the eighteenth century.
Admittedly, space and time are now thought to be closely related, but this
change in philosophical perspective has had no effect on time-keeping.54
Provisions that employ precise measures of time thus stand at one end of a
definiteness/vagueness continuum. Perhaps because these provisions have
always been susceptible to straightforward application, no court cases have
arisen concerning them.
At the other end are provisions that were vague when adopted and
remain so today. Many of the Constitution’s power- and rights-granting
clauses come under this heading. At most, the words employed in these
clauses have a weak denotative power; they refer to matters such as
commerce, speech, searches and seizures, but provide little further
guidance for interpreters. The Punishments Clause provides a particularly
striking example of this. Even the Congressmen who commented on it at
the time it was proposed were troubled by its vagueness. According to the
Annals of Congress, William Smith of South Carolina “objected to the
words ‘nor cruel and unusual punishments,’ the import of them being too
indefinite.”55 Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire remarked that the
provision “seems to express a great deal of humanity, on which I have no
objection to it, but as it seems to have no meaning in it, I do not think it
necessary.”56 Livermore’s comments did not carry the day. Following his
speech, the reporter for the Annals noted laconically, “[t]he question was
put on the [Punishments Clause], and it was agreed to by a considerable
52. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (requiring that the President have attained the age
of thirty-five years).
53. See U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1 (requiring that the Presidential term end on
January 20th and that the terms of Senators and Representatives end on January 3rd).
54. See PETER GALISON, EINSTEIN’S CLOCKS, POINCARE’S MAPS: EMPIRES OF TIME
(2003) (using a rotating map, with changes in vertical and horizontal distances doing
nothing to change the actual distance between two points, to explain that transformations of
space and time would still preserve ordinary space and time).
55. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 754 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
56. Id.
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majority.”57
An appeal to the text can be decisive, then, for clauses that contain
precise metrics. It is no more than a starting move in a long chain of
reasoning, however, when the provision invoked is chronically vague.58
Although not the only possible frameworks for interpreting the
Constitution, originalism and historicism are of interest because they stand
as the most appealing remedies for the problem of chronic vagueness, the
interpretive issue at the core of most constitutional disputes. On an
originalist account, chronic vagueness can be resolved by considering the
ratifiers’59 intent concerning a provision’s meaning. Historicism, by
contrast, proposes to resolve chronic vagueness by examining changes in
social values relevant to a clause, rejecting transient changes (advocates of
a “living constitution” arguably fail to guard sufficiently against this)60
while giving constitutional standing to enduring ones that have achieved
wide consensus.61 The contrast between the two methods is particularly
clear in Punishments Clause opinions.

57. Id.
58. For a discussion of vagueness in legal language, including the argument that
legislators purposely avoid precise language and prefer to write vague laws, see Timothy
Endicott, Law is Necessarily Vague, 7 LEGAL THEORY 379, 379 (2001). See also Dorothy
Edgington, The Philosophical Problem of Vagueness, 7 LEGAL THEORY 371, 374 (2001)
(arguing that “[v]agueness is here to stay . . . . It is not a defect of natural languages.”).
59. I speak throughout of the Constitution’s ratifiers rather than its authors because it is
the former rather than the latter who made it a legally binding instrument. In this respect, I
follow James Madison, who remarked that “[a]s the instrument came from [the Convention],
it was nothing more than the draft of a plan, nothing but a dead letter, until life and validity
were breathed into it by the voice of the people, speaking through the several State
Conventions.” James Madison, Speech on the Jay Treaty in the Fourth Congress (Apr. 6,
1796), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 263, 272 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906). Needless
to say, the ideas of the authors of provisions and also the ideas of publicists who promoted
the Constitution (in particular, the ideas of Madison and Alexander Hamilton) may
sometimes provide guidance as to the ratifiers’ understandings of what they were adopting.
60. A conception of the Constitution as something that is eternally remade in the
present is discernible in the comments of two prominent scholars of constitutional law at
Princeton University of the early twentieth century. See Edward S. Corwin, Constitution v.
Constitutional Theory, in AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 99, 108 (Alpheus Mason &
Gerald Garvey eds., 1964) (arguing that “[t]he proper point of view from which to approach
the task of interpreting the constitution is that of regarding it as a living statute, palpitating
with the purpose of the hour, reenacted with every waking breath of the American people”);
WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 69 (1908) (maintaining that “the
Constitution is . . . a vehicle of life, and its spirit is always the spirit of the age”). These
comments stand in marked contrast with the historicist emphasis, defended here, on the
deference due the past in constitutional interpretation.
61. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW 167-68 (1990) (listing electronic surveillance as an enduring change in the way the
Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures; emphasizing that courts
may hear First Amendment cases involving television and radio broadcasting, two enduring
elements of society that were not in existence at the time the Amendment was ratified).
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B. Originalist Analysis of the Punishments Clause
Originalism has gained prominence through its emphasis on ratifiers’
intent. This point in turn is best understood in terms of a more basic one:
the premise that the distinctive characteristic of a constitutional provision is
that it definitively orders legal relationships through the exercise of will by
an authoritative body.62 In fact, this is an essential feature of any positivist
analysis that treats law as a command of the sovereign;63 it applies to
statutes and regulations as much as it does to constitutional provisions. The
key feature of constitutional originalism is that it focuses attention on “We
the People”—and the institutions entitled to speak for “us”—as the
sovereign body possessing the authority to enact constitutional provisions.
A provision has the status of constitutional law, an originalist maintains,
because at a given moment in time the people act in their sovereign
capacity through appropriate institutions to adopt it.64 The people can of
course revoke or supersede the provision. In the absence of a countermand
from the same sovereign source, however, a provision functions as a legally
binding command.
To an originalist, this point accounts for why a president must be thirtyfive and why Congress must convene on January 3rd of every oddnumbered year. These are legally binding rules; their status as such is
established by the fact that they were laid down by the people in their
sovereign capacity. Had the sovereign established the more open-ended
rule that the president be mature, an originalist would require interpreters to
consider the meaning of “mature” in eighteenth-century discourse. But
nothing so complicated is required of interpreters of the age-qualification.
It imposes a bright-line rule for the presidency. However much interpreters
may wish to question this rule, they may not, given the binding status of the
Constitution.
What about the Constitution’s chronically vague terms? An originalist
would maintain that provisions coming under this heading—the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses, for example—can be brought within
the method’s framework provided attention is given to the ratifiers’
62. See Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional
Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 233 (1988)
(arguing that the Framers’ intent matters because “the force of law derives from the
authority of the lawmaker”).
63. See John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, in THE PROVINCE OF
JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE USES OF THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE 11-13 (H.L.A.
Hart ed., 1968) (classifying one set of positive law as that set out by men in positions of
political superiority to all other men, and labeling all laws or rules as commands).
64. See Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 376
(1981) (“Our legal grundnorm has been that the body politic can at a specific point in time
definitively order relationships, and that such an ordering is binding on all organs of
government until changed by amendment.”).
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understandings of a clause’s meaning.65 This of course requires attention to
intricate questions of historical fact.66 It could turn out that the ratifiers
approved broad language because they wanted interpreters to grapple with
the subtle moral issues associated with words such as “liberty” and “equal.”
But the opposite is also possible. That is, the historical record might
demonstrate that the ratifiers used broad language while wanting it to be
narrowly applied. The Fourteenth Amendment’s ratifiers, for example,
may have understood that, despite the generality of the terms contained in
Section 1, it would be applied only to civil and not to political rights.67
What is needed, then, is a specific type of historical excavation: a close
examination of the attitudes, values, beliefs, and intentions that informed
those who adopted a given provision. It is in this sense that originalists
propose their method as a cure for chronic vagueness. In doing so, they
can concede the vagueness of many of the terms contained in the
Constitution but still affirm that the terms can be narrowed in scope and
application by identifying the specific beliefs of those who adopted them.
The contemporary Court has often been receptive to originalist analyses
of the Constitution.68 It has not, however, adopted originalism as a method
for interpreting the Punishments Clause. Indeed, even Justice Scalia, who
along with Justice Thomas has vigorously advocated originalist
methodology in reading the Constitution,69 incorporated historicist themes
into one of his majority opinions analyzing the clause.70 Scalia has taken
65. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 5-19 (1977) (insisting that the Framers’ intended to introduce
terms that were familiar and easily understood; they did not intent to introduce vague and
unfamiliar terms that would be open to future interpretation).
66. Bork, supra note 61, at 150 (remarking that determining the original meaning will
avoid the problem of determining the level of generality in which to interpret constitutional
provisions).
67. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL
PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 126-27 (1988) (noting assertions by Senators and
Congressmen during debates about Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment that it would
apply to civil, and not political, rights).
68. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 741 (1999) (“We look first to evidence of
the original understanding of the Constitution.”); see also Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 474
(2002) (examining the history of the constitutional phrase “actual enumeration” when
determining the validity of methods currently employed in conducting the census).
69. There are occasions when each, while writing from an originalist perspective, has
reached contrary conclusions. See, for example, their disagreement in McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995), about original understandings concerning the
constitutional protection of political speech advanced in anonymous leaflets. Justice
Thomas asked, “[w]hether the phrase ‘freedom of speech, or of the press,’ as originally
understood, protected anonymous political leafleting.” Id. at 359 (Thomas, J., concurring).
He concluded that it did. Justice Scalia, on the other hand, felt that the majority’s decision
went against the way free speech was understood by the ratifiers of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Id. at 371 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
70. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 (1989) (writing that the Court has not
been confined to the original meaning and intent of the Eighth Amendment, but rather has
been interpreted in a “flexible and dynamic manner”).
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an originalist tack, though, when writing for himself or for a plurality in
cases involving the clause.71 His foremost originalist opinion in this
context is the one he wrote sustaining the judgment of the Court in
Harmelin v. Michigan.72 Scalia’s Harmelin conclusions rest on two
familiar premises: first, that the meaning the ratifiers ascribed to the term
“cruel and unusual punishments” determines its constitutionally
permissible scope73 and, second, that that meaning can be determined only
by careful review (in Harmelin, Scalia’s historical analysis consumes
nineteen pages of the U.S. Reports)74 of the documentary record.75 Scalia
makes no secret of his ambition in Harmelin; it is to identify the “most
plausible” of many possible readings of the clause.76 He heaps scorn on
Justice White’s dissenting argument in Harmelin that the Punishments
Clause can “reasonably” be understood in a different way.77 Reasonable
approximation of original understandings is not enough, Scalia maintains:
[O]ur task is not merely to identify the various meanings . . . [the clause]
“could reasonably” bear, and then impose the one that from a policy
standpoint best pleases us. Rather, we are to strive as best we can to
select from among the various “reasonable” possibilities the most
plausible meaning. 78

Scalia draws on two types of originalist evidence to establish his “most
plausible” reading of “cruel and unusual.” One has to do with word usage.
Many state constitutions adopted in the years prior to the Eighth
Amendment’s ratification, Scalia notes, contained provisions that included
the words “cruel” and “unusual.”79 One placed the adjectives in disjunctive
form (“cruel or unusual”), others in conjunctive form (“cruel and
unusual”).80 The Eighth Amendment’s ratifiers must have been aware of

71. When writing in dissent, Scalia has in fact openly stated his opposition to the
evolving standards test: “In determining that capital punishment of offenders who
committed murder before age eighteen is ‘cruel and unusual’ under the Eighth Amendment,
the Court first considers, in accordance with our modern (though in my view mistaken)
jurisprudence, whether there is a ‘national consensus’ . . . that laws allowing such
executions contravene our modern standards of decency.” Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct.
1183, 1217-18 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
72. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
73. See id. at 975 (“[T]he ultimate question is not what ‘cruel and unusual punishments’
meant in the Declaration of Rights [of 1689], but what its meaning was to the Americans
who adopted the Eighth Amendment.”).
74. Id. at 966-85.
75. Id. at 976-78 (looking to state constitutions, floor debates in the first Congress, and
state conventions, among others, to find the meaning given to the term “cruel and unusual
punishment” by the ratifiers).
76. Id. at 976-77 n.6.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 977-78.
80. See id. at 977 (distinguishing the New Hampshire Constitution’s disjunctive
language from the Ohio Constitution’s conjunctive language).
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these options, Scalia suggests; they thus must have thought of the clause as
establishing two independent conditions for permissible punishment.81
Where does this lead us? Unfortunately, not far, given the meaning of
the word “unusual.” Citing the 1828 edition of Noah Webster’s dictionary,
Scalia remarks that “unusual” meant “(as it continues to mean today) ‘such
as [does not] occu[r] in ordinary practice.’”82 He continues: “by
forbidding ‘cruel and unusual punishments,’ the Clause [therefore] disables
the Legislature from authorizing particular forms or ‘modes’ of
punishment—specifically, cruel methods of punishment that are not
regularly or customarily employed.”83 But if “unusual” is an independent
condition, then surely innovations in punishment are unconstitutional even
if they are not cruel. The point is hardly academic. In 1890, the Court was
confronted with the question of whether New York’s use of the electric
chair, an innovation at the time, was unconstitutional.84 Given Scalia’s
independent-conditions reading of the clause (a punishment passes muster
if it is neither cruel nor unusual), the answer would have to be yes. But the
Court reached the opposite conclusion,85 and indeed it is hard to imagine
judges reasoning otherwise when confronted with an innovation that
reduces the infliction of pain. Scalia’s word-usage analysis thus fails at the
most elementary level to account for Eighth Amendment case law. Under
his approach, even innovations that lessen the severity of pain are
unconstitutional. It is hardly surprising that no court has taken seriously
this reading of the amendment.
Scalia’s other interpretive approach avoids this pitfall; indeed, it
provides a plausible reading of the clause, though whether it can be called
the “most plausible” is open to serious doubt. Drawing on legislation
adopted by the first Congress as well as early nineteenth century judicial
interpretations of similarly worded state constitutional clauses, Scalia
shows that the terms “cruel and unusual” were applied only to certain
methods of punishment (and not to categories of punishment or to a
comparison of punishments in an effort to determine the proportionality of
a penalty) by members of the founding generation and the immediately
succeeding one.86 Was “cruel and unusual” thus a term of art at the time of
ratification? Was it a phrase capable of wider application in the ordinary
speech of the time but understood by its adopters to be applicable in law to
a narrower class of phenomena than its roots in everyday speech suggest?

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 976.
Id.
Id.
In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
Id. at 447.
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 982-85.
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Scalia’s analysis suggests that it was;87 in fact, this is what makes his
approach plausible—though the very plausibility of this argument
undercuts the word-usage argument, for then “cruel and unusual” cannot be
interpreted as a statement of independent conditions (the crux of his wordusage argument) but instead as a kind of code phrase (“cruelandunusual”)
for specific punitive practices and not others.
But if we adopt this latter approach and treat “cruel and unusual” as a
term-of-art, we produce an interpretation that is plausible, but no more than
plausible. This is because Scalia reaches his term-of-art conclusions by
ignoring historical evidence inconsistent with his premises. True, early
judicial interpretations of the phrase focused on methods of punishment.
But Scalia should also have cited congressional critics of the clause such as
William Smith and Samuel Livermore who emphasized its inherent
vagueness.88 Indeed, had he proceeded with the candor expected of a
professional historian, Scalia could (and should) have noted that even the
clause’s defenders conceded that it was vague—and claimed only that such
vagueness must be tolerated given the absence of a better alternative.
James Iredell, for example, a future Justice of the Supreme Court,
considered the vagueness objection to be fair.89 However, Iredell further
contended that an enumeration of acceptable and prohibited punishments
would be even worse. Not only would such a list appear “perfectly
ridiculous,” Iredell said, but it would also cause the legislature only a little
more trouble given the possibility of devising new punishments not
mentioned in the original list.90 Iredell’s point, it should be noted, does not
intimate that “cruel and unusual” is a term of art. On the contrary, Iredell,
like Smith and Livermore, took seriously the broad generality of the
language contained in the clause and the interpretive problems this might
later engender. He differed with the clause’s opponents only in his
willingness to accept this as better than the alternatives.
Needless to say, Scalia’s failure to cite the remarks of Smith, Livermore,
and Iredell does not demonstrate any incoherence in his originalist analysis
87. See id. at 982-83 (noting that early nineteenth century state courts interpreted the
words “cruel and unusual punishment,” as used in state constitutions and the federal
constitution, as imposing a prohibition only on certain modes of punishment).
88. See The Congressional Register (Aug. 17, 1789) (stating that William Smith
“objected to the words ‘nor cruel and unusual punishment,’ the import of them being too
indefinite” and Samuel Livermore said that the proposed amendment “seems to have no
meaning in it”), reprinted in 11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1285, 1290 (Charlene B. Bickford et al. eds., 1992).
89. See James Iredell, Answer to Mason’s Objections to the New Constitution, in
PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 360, 335, 360 (P. Ford ed., 1968)
(commenting that the “expressions ‘unusual and severe’ or ‘cruel and unusual’ surely would
have been too vague to have been of any consequence, since they admit of no clear and
precise significantion”).
90. Id. at 360.
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of the Eighth Amendment. The logic of originalism is unaffected by his
omission, for that logic depends not on the accuracy of historical research
but on the claim that a founding generation binds later ones by its specific
understanding of vague words.91 I return to this point later. Two different
points need to be noted here. The first is that Scalia’s omissions
demonstrate that the originalist framework can be one-sidedly applied. The
other is that, in acknowledging the complexity of the historical record,
originalists must also accept the possibility that their method will produce
inconclusive results. The results may be inconclusive either because the
ratifiers could not agree on the referential scope of the terms they were
employing or because they were united in their uncertainty about the
possible range of application. Iredell, for one, clearly favored the
uncertain-range-of-application thesis.92 Although it is unclear what other
ratifiers thought, it is certainly possible that many of them also viewed
“cruel and unusual” as no more than evocative terms, words of cultural
significance in that they distinguished common law from continental
jurisdictions but otherwise words without a clear point of reference.93 On
this account, the clause was tethered to specific punitive practices by
judges of the succeeding generation not because the ratification debates
justify this limitation but because later judges sought some kind of limiting
construction for vague words. It is not my purpose to establish the truth of
this hypothesis. It is enough to note that the hypothesis merits serious
consideration, for once the hypothesis is granted at least the status of
reasonableness, one then must also grant that Scalia’s Harmelin opinion is
more an act of judicial will than it is a dispassionate analysis of the
historical evidence.
C. Historicist Analysis of the Punishments Clause
Originalism and historicism can both be understood as responses to the
problems of chronic vagueness in key portions of the Constitution’s text.
Neither can be justified by reference to this, however. As noted,
originalism’s roots are in the command version of legal positivism—
specifically, in the claim that the Constitution, like any other law, is to be
91. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
92. Iredell, supra note 89, at 360.
93. During the Virginia ratifying convention of 1788, for example, in the course of
objecting to the absence of a Bill of Rights, Patrick Henry remarked: “What has
distinguished our ancestors?—That they would not admit of tortures, or cruel and barbarous
punishment. But Congress may introduce the practice of the civil law, in preference to that
of the common law. They may introduce the practice of France, Spain, and Germany . . . .”
3 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 447-48 (Jonathan Elliot ed.,
Ayer Co. 1987) (1787); see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 370-71 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1979) (1769) (stating Blackstone’s comparison of
English and continental punitive practices).
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understood as the sovereign’s deliberate ordering of legal relationships.
Historicism, on the other hand, treats the Constitution not as the command
of previous generations to the present but as the coordinating text of the
present, sovereign generation that, through ongoing consent, determines
how the project of political freedom is to be conducted. The Constitution’s
binding force, a historicist emphasizes, is intergenerational in nature. The
Constitution not only provides a coordinating device for the present
generation; it also links the present to the past, making possible gradual
changes in an ongoing process.
That the Constitution rests on popular acceptance while at the same time
drawing on deeply ingrained understandings derived from the past is a
proposition that has a venerable pedigree in American history. In a
properly functioning state, John Adams contended, “[t]he great Principles
of the Constitution, are intimately known . . . . [I]t is scarcely extravagant
to say, they are drawn in and imbibed with the Nurses [sic] Milk and first
Air.”94 Oliver Ellsworth, later to be the second Chief Justice of the United
States, defended the work of the Philadelphia Convention along similar
lines; in doing so, it is helpful to note, he explicitly rejected the proposition
that the Constitution should contain terms of art. Had the Constitution
“been expressed in the scientific language of the law,” Ellsworth wrote, “or
[in] those terms of art which we often find in political compositions . . . the
people . . . [would have] to accept it . . . [by a] leap in the dark.”95 And
Joseph Story treated accessible language as essential to the American
project when he remarked that constitutions “are instruments of a practical
nature, founded on the common business of human life, adapted to
common wants, designed for common use, and fitted for common
understandings.”96
The popular character of the Constitution, a historicist would maintain,
justifies judicial attention to changing practices and values. In particular,
historicism rests on three central theses. The first has to do with fidelity to
practice.
A satisfactory account of the practice of constitutional
interpretation must be able to explain why readings of the text have
departed fundamentally from original understandings of its meaning.
Historicism is relatively successful on this score; originalism is not (indeed,
originalism is properly understood as a rebuke to a great deal of
contemporary constitutional doctrine). Second, historicism is designed to
94. 2 JOHN ADAMS, DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS 3-4 (L.H. Butterfield
ed., 1961).
95. Oliver Ellsworth, A Landholder V, in 14 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 335 (John Paul Kaminksi & Merrill Saladino eds.,
1983).
96. JOSEPH STORY, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 43637 (1833).
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provide a convincing account of the relationship between past and present
in constitutional law. It treats provisions enacted long ago not as
commands to the present but as vectors that have set a direction for the
enterprise of collective self-government, a direction subject to subtle
alteration by subsequent generations. Historicism, on this account, is
concerned with the cumulative unfolding of path-dependent possibilities,
not with building anew. And third, historicism holds that new values and
practices achieve constitutional standing only when they (a) have gained
wide acceptance over a substantial period of time and (b) are compatible
with the commitment to individual liberty established at the outset. The
issue of consistency with individual liberty is straightforward when new
values enlarge on those of earlier generations. It is more problematic, and
so requires more careful scrutiny, when the new values transform older
ones.
On this analysis, historicism, like originalism, requires interpreters to
begin with the text. Unlike originalism, however, it anticipates the
possibility of legitimate readings that will differ from the ratifiers’
understanding of what they created. In this sense, historicists think of the
text as the opposite of a blackboard. A blackboard is erased and used
again. For constitutional historicists, the text is never erased; rather, it is
the starting-point for an ever-lengthening writing surface that contains not
just the text but carefully considered modifications of original
understandings. Punishments Clause jurisprudence illustrates this point in
a particularly straightforward fashion. Original understandings of “cruel
and unusual” have not been erased. Rather, they have been enlarged and
extended. Thus the initial “writing tablet” for the clause has been extended
as well; indeed, a historicist would maintain that one can grasp the true
import of the Punishments Clause only by considering it in light of
developments that occurred long after its adoption.
Two twentieth century opinions established the historicist framework
that now guides interpretation of the clause. The first is the Court’s
opinion in Weems v. United States.97 At issue in the case was the
permissibility of a cadena corporale imposed under Philippine law by
American authorities following the conquest of 1898.98 Weems, who had
been found guilty of falsifying records, received a twelve-year sentence to
chained labor and was deprived of certain civil rights.99
The Court might simply have rejected the punishment on cultural
grounds. Because cadena corporale was unknown in Anglo-American

97. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
98. Id. at 359.
99. Id. at 358.
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law,100 the Court could have treated it as an unacceptable cultural
transplant—as “unusual,” in other words. Although the theme of cultural
distance is discernible in Weems,101 the opinion did not treat this as
essential. Rather, it effected a fundamental reordering of punishments
jurisprudence. Previous Court opinions had asked whether certain methods
of punishment violate the Eighth Amendment.102 In rejecting a static
framework in which certain methods are deemed acceptable and others not,
the Weems Court maintained that the amendment is not fixed by “impotent
and lifeless formulas” and that it is not “confine[d] . . . to such penalties
and punishment as were inflicted by the Stuarts.”103 The Punishments
Clause should be dynamically interpreted, Weems stated. Because the
clause is “progressive” in nature, the Court maintained, it “may acquire
meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.”104
Here, then, is the essential premise of Eighth Amendment historicism.
Given the imprecise language of the Punishments Clause, Weems
concluded, the provision’s referential scope can properly be determined in
light of gradual changes in public opinion about the propriety of punitive
practices.105 The possibility of constitutional historicism arises out of the
interplay of linguistic vagueness and changes in public values.
But how is this possibility to be translated into practice? Chief Justice
Warren’s plurality opinion in Trop v. Dulles,106 took the critical step in this
regard.
Echoing Weems, Warren stated that “the words of the
[Punishments Clause] are not precise, and . . . their scope is not static.”107
Warren then proposed the formula that has since informed most
punishments cases. He asserted that “[t]he Amendment . . . must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
a maturing society.”108 Having been incorporated into numerous opinions
of the Court over the last half century, this framework has been applied to
issues as diverse as capital punishment,109 prison overcrowding,110 and the
100. See id. at 377 (noting that the punishment “has no fellow in American legislation”).
101. See id. (“Let us remember that [the punishment in question] has come to us from a
government of a different form and genius from ours.”).
102. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) (holding that execution by electric
chair is not violative of the Eighth Amendment); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134-35
(1878) (holding that execution by shooting does not violate the Eighth Amendment); see
also Weems, 217 U.S. at 370-71 (discussing Kemmler and Wilkerson).
103. Weems, 217 U.S. at 372-73.
104. Id. at 378.
105. Id.
106. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
107. Id. at 100-01.
108. Id. at 101.
109. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002) (stating that the Eighth
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 603 (1977) (holding that
resolution of whether the death penalty is appropriate for the crime of rape requires inquiry
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imposition of prison discipline.111 Even Justice Scalia has appealed to it
when writing for the Court,112 though of course he has disdained it when
writing for himself.113
In following Trop, the Court has added an important caveat, one that
must be considered carefully before proceeding with our analysis of Eighth
Amendment historicism. Post-Trop decisions often contain a qualification
which, in effect, holds that whatever society’s standards of decency may
be, the Court must make an independent judgment of the constitutionality
of a given type of judgment.114 If it were taken at face value, this
qualification would make independent judicial assessment the key factor
for analysis, not the evolving standards rule. But the Court’s comments
should not be read in this way, for in fact there is no case in which the
majority’s “independent judgment” has diverged from their conclusions
about contemporary standards of decency. In death penalty cases, for
example, when the Court has found that public sentiment does not support
capital punishment for a given type of crime, it has always exercised its
“independent judgment” against the death penalty.115 And, when the Court
has found that public attitudes support capital punishment for a crime, its
into objective indicators of society’s evolving standards of decency).
110. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (concluding that courts
cannot use a static test to determine whether conditions of confinement are cruel and
unusual).
111. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (ruling that gratuitously
allowing the beating or rape of one prisoner by another does not square with evolving
standards of decency); Hudson v. McMillian, 501 U.S. 1, 8 (1992) (incorporating the
evolving standards of decency framework when holding that excessive physical punishment
where the inmate does not suffer serious injury may constitute cruel and unusual
punishment).
112. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 368-77 (1989) (stating that the Court has
not limited the constitutional prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment to barbarous
methods generally outlawed in the eighteenth century, but has interpreted it in a dynamic
manner).
113. See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1217 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(rejecting the majority’s use of the evolving standards test on the grounds that the test
deviates from the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment).
114. See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312-13 (noting that the Court will first review the
judgment of the legislatures that have addressed the suitability of imposing the death penalty
on the mentally retarded and then they will consider reasons for agreeing or disagreeing
with their judgment); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982) (acknowledging that the
Court has no reason to disagree with the judgment of most legislatures that a person’s
participation in a robbery that results in two killings does not merit the death penalty);
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (reasoning that the Constitution contemplates
that the Court’s own judgment will ultimately be brought to bear on the question of the
acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment).
115. See, e.g., Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1183 (holding that the imposition of the death penalty
on juvenile offenders under the age of eighteen is forbidden by the Eighth Amendment);
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304 (holding that the execution of the mentally retarded contravenes the
Eighth Amendment); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. at 399 (1986) (holding that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the execution of the insane); Coker, 433 U.S. at 584 (holding that the
sentence of death for the crime of rape is grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment
that is forbidden by the Eighth Amendment).
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“independent judgment” has provided reasons to uphold the death
penalty.116 Indeed, if we examine the two death penalty opinions
concerning the mentally retarded rendered within thirteen years of one
another, we can see that the change in the majority’s independent judgment
(Penry: capital punishment acceptable for the mentally retarded;117 Atkins:
capital punishment unacceptable)118 tracked changes in public attitudes
about this issue.119 The possibility exists, then, that judicial judgment will
someday diverge from public opinion concerning punishment for given
crimes. In cases decided since Trop, however, the public-sentiment dog
has wagged the tail of independent judicial judgment.120
Once it is granted that Trop provides the framework for Eighth
Amendment historicism, the next question to ask has to do with the
rationale that can be advanced for judicial adoption of the framework. The
answer to this can be found in what might be called a “naïve textualist”
reading of the Punishments Clause. On this approach the clause can be
said to invite consideration of the moral sentiments of the community
concerning state-sponsored punishment. The notion of a moral sentiment is
particularly apt in this context. Eighteenth and nineteenth century
116. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (holding that the Eighth Amendment
does not categorically prohibit the execution of the mentally retarded).
117. Id.
118. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304. Justice O’Connor, it should be pointed out, exercised her
independent judgment in each instance consistently with the national trends discerned by the
majorities in each case. Id.; Penry, 492 U.S. at 302.
119. The cases involving capital punishment of juveniles produce a slight variation on
this. In Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), Justice Scalia, writing for a plurality of
the Court in upholding capital punishment for a seventeen-year-old convicted of murder,
“emphatically rejected” the proposition that the Court should exercise its independent
judgment as to the appropriateness of such a sanction. Id. at 377-78. In Roper, on the other
hand, Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court followed the usual pattern of noting that
national sentiment had turned against such punishment and then explained why the Court’s
independent judgment confirmed such a trend. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1194-95.
120. My comments about the derivative nature of the Court’s exercise of “independent
judgment” in cases decided with the Trop framework are sufficient to establish its relative
insignificance within these cases. It should be noted, though, that Justice Scalia has
questioned the very relevance of an independent judgment test under Trop. In Roper,
Justice Scalia contended:
If the Eighth Amendment set forth an ordinary rule of law, it would indeed be the
role of the Court to say what the law is. But the Court having pronounced that the
Eighth Amendment is an ever-changing reflection of “the evolving standards of
decency” of our society, it makes no sense for the Justices then to prescribe those
standards rather than discern them from the practices of our people.
Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1222 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Though in some respects a caricature of the Trop test, there is also considerable merit in
Scalia’s argument on this point. Because Trop speaks of the “progress of a maturing
society,” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-101 (1958), it is misleading to speak of it as
contemplating “an ever-changing reflection” of society, for Trop contemplates
unidirectional change toward lenity in punishment, a point considered at greater length
subsequently. See infra notes 133-135 and accompanying text. On the other hand, Trop can
properly be said to preclude separate judicial analysis of a trend once judges have
concluded that it does indeed enlarge on the original prohibition of cruelty.
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commentators routinely suggested synonyms such as “fiendish” and
“barbarous” to make sense of the word “cruel.”121 Blackstone approached
the issue from the opposite direction by offering the antonym “humane”
when contrasting English practices of punishment with those on the
continent.122 Each of these terms refers to what in eighteenth century
parlance would have been called “moral sentiments.”
Scottish
philosophers such as David Hume and Adam Smith provided accounts of
such sentiments that influenced discussion throughout the English-speaking
world.123 Hume and Smith thought of moral sentiments as emotionally
charged responses to the conduct of others that, through a process of
sympathy and psychic distance, result in dispassionate assessment of their
conduct.124 At their point of origin, Smith believed, moral sentiments are
involuntary; they are “principles of [our] nature.”125 However, through the
force of “fellow-feeling,” they are refined into more dispassionate
conclusions about the merits of another person’s acts.126 The term “cruel,”
a historicist reading of the Punishments Clause would maintain, stands as a
constitutional commitment to sustaining the shared moral sentiments of the
community concerning the circumstances of state-sponsored punishment.
Hume and Smith seem never to have considered the possibility that the
shared moral sentiments of a given community might take on an enlarged
frame of reference over time. But it is easy to see how this is possible—
how, to use the term employed by Annette Baier, a modern commentator
on Hume, there can be “a progress of sentiments.”127 Over time, public
opinion about the appropriateness of a given type of punishment has been
expressed by resort to terms such as “humane,” “compassionate,” and
121. See JAMES BAYARD, A BRIEF EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 154 (2d ed. 1840) (advancing the proposition that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
“the gratification of fiendish passion”); BENJAMIN OLIVER, THE RIGHTS OF AN AMERICAN
CITIZEN 186 (1832) (discussing the “various barbarous and cruel punishments” inflicted in
other countries). Each passage is cited in Justice Scalia’s opinion in Harmelin v. Michigan,
501 U.S. 957, 981 (1991).
122. Contrasting English practices with those of continental countries, Blackstone
remarked:
[T]he humanity of the English nation has authorized, by a tacit consent, an almost
general mitigation of such part of these judgments as savour of torture or cruelty: a
sledge or hurdle being usually allowed to such traitors as are condemned to be
drawn; and there being very few instances (and those accidental or by negligence)
of any person’s being embowelled or burned, till previously deprived of sensation
by strangling.
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 93, at 370.
123. DAVID HUME, ENQUIRIES CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND CONCERNING
THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 289 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 1975) (1777); ADAM SMITH, THE
THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 49, 66 (E.G. West ed., 1969) (1759).
124. HUME, supra note 123, at 289; SMITH, supra note 123, at 49, 66.
125. SMITH, supra note 123, at 47.
126. Id. at 49.
127. See generally ANNETTE BAIER, A PROGRESS OF SENTIMENTS: REFLECTIONS ON
HUME’S TREATISE (1991).
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“barbarous,” with the terms remaining constant even though their frame of
reference has been progressively enlarged. Consider, for example, the
claim of an 1811 pamphleteer that public execution excites in spectators
“emotions of pity, humanity and sympathy” and so induces in them “a
temporary disaffection to the government.”128 The gist of this claim is that
public execution is counterproductive, a common argument among capital
punishment opponents in the early nineteenth century. Of special interest
is the author’s use of the terminology associated with moral sentiment
theory in developing his position: his claim that spectators (Smith
maintained that moral assessments are rendered by an impartial spectator)
experience emotions such as pity and sympathy.129 An Ohioan’s 1847
pamphlet opposing public execution provides a further example of the
influence of the moral sentiment framework. “The exhibition of extreme
punishment,” the pamphleteer maintained, “seems to have a natural
tendency to destroy the moral sensibility, and produce a shocking depravity
of the human character.”130 Opposition to public execution was rare at the
time the Eighth Amendment was adopted.131 As these examples make
clear, by the early nineteenth century opponents of the practice could draw
on the rhetoric of moral sentiments to further their cause. That they did not
state that they were extending the referential scope of this terminology—
that they talked as if moral sentiments always have the same scope—
simply underscores the importance of the rhetoric of permanence in the
advancement of moral beliefs.132
Now let us turn to the term “unusual.” If “cruel” is to be understood in
terms of sentiments that reject certain types of sentiments as barbaric, then
“unusual” stands as a directive to consider whether those types of
punishment have, by virtue of changes in public sentiment, become so rare
as to warrant constitutional prohibition. The direction of public opinion is
critical in this regard. On a historicist account, as moral sentiments become
128. STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 148 (2002).
129. SMITH, supra note 123, at 66.
130. BANNER, supra note 128, at 149.
131. Id. at 27 (comparing the eighteenth century American sentiment toward attending
executions to the nineteenth century sentiment where “respectable Americans” would come
to feel embarrassment at the idea of attending).
132. An interesting example of this is to be found in the Court’s comment on whether the
insane can be eligible for the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment. In holding that
the amendment makes them ineligible, the Court remarked that “the intuition that such an
execution simply offends humanity is evidently shared across this Nation.” Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409 (1986). The appeal to “intuition” and “humanity” plus the
powerful adverb “simply” all illustrate the continuing hold of moral-sentiments rhetoric in
judicial discussion of the Eighth Amendment. As used by the Ford majority, that rhetoric is
systematically ambiguous as to the issue of evaluative change. The term “humanity”
suggests an unchanging sentiment about a given practice. On the other hand, the reference
to a sentiment “shared across this Nation” leaves open the possibility that it might not have
been at an earlier time or that it might not be shared by the people of other nations.
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more refined—as the frame of reference for “humanity” and “compassion”
expands—the range of constitutionally permissible punishment diminishes.
It is in this context that we can understand the appeal to progress in Weems
and Trop. The term expresses an idea essential to penal reform ever since
the founding of the republic. Benjamin Rush, one of the first prominent
critics of capital punishment in America, appealed to the idea of progress
when he remarked that “‘[t]he world has certainly undergone a material
change for the better within the last two hundred years.’”133 A New Yorker
writing shortly afterwards put the point in terms of progressive historicism.
“‘If we examine history in general,’” he argued, “‘we shall readily
perceive, that as mankind became more civilized, and advanced toward
refinement, punishments became less severe.’”134 The Colored American
summarized this line of reasoning in one word while supporting an 1840
bill to abolish capital punishment in Connecticut: “PROGRESS.”135
A historicist would not maintain that the interpretation of the text
employed here—use of “cruel” and “unusual” to track changing sentiments
about punishment—captures original understandings of the Eighth
Amendment. In its unalloyed form, historicism makes no claim that
dynamic interpretation is consistent with the ratifiers’ understandings. One
must always allow for the possibility that ratifiers of a provision intended
later generations of interpreters to enlarge on their understanding of the
provision’s scope. But historicism does not insist on this. What matters
here is that there is a trajectory of change, one that identifies values about
which there is a broad consensus and traces these to a starting point
established by the ratifiers’ original commitments.
How, then, are courts to determine whether there is a broad consensus
concerning a specific punitive practice? This methodological question
raises issues that have a strong parallel in originalism. In each instance, a
difficult problem of fact turns out to be critical to the implementation of an
interpretive framework. Moreover, in each instance, judges can inject their
personal biases in deploying the methodology. Indeed, it is fair to say that
concerns about personal bias in the implementation of historicism’s
methods are as well-founded as they are in the case of originalism.
Consider first a relatively uncontroversial instance of Eighth Amendment
historicism. At issue in Coker v. Georgia136 was a statutorily authorized
death sentence for rape. Although rape was a capital offense in all the
states at the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified, by 1977, when Coker

133.
134.
135.
136.

BANNER, supra note 128, at 100.
Id.
Id. at 125.
433 U.S. 584 (1977).
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was decided, only four states continued to employ it.137 Using the Trop
test, the justices concluded that death is not permissible for rape.138 Juries
routinely declined to impose the death penalty for the crime; indeed, no
northern state had carried out an execution for rape since the midnineteenth century.139 Even most southern states had discontinued the
practice.140 In Coker, the Court thus accorded constitutional standing to a
broadly shared sentiment about punishment for rape. There had been no
formal deliberation of the kind anticipated by Article V.141 Jury verdicts
and legislative enactments, however, provide evidence of occasions for
deliberation outside Article V. The Coker Court found that this analysis
was sufficiently strong evidence of a settled consensus to justify enlarging
on a value already established by the ratifiers.142
Atkins v. Virginia143 and Roper v. Simmons,144 on the other hand, pose a
more serious problem of justification for a historicist because the existence
of a settled consensus relevant to each is open to challenge. Thirteen years
before Atkins was decided, the Court, in Penry v. Lynaugh,145 upheld
capital punishment for the mentally retarded. Fifteen years before Roper,
in Stanford v. Kentucky146 (decided on the same day as Penry), the Court
upheld capital punishment for those who commit murder while seventeen
years of age.147 Relying on trends of little more than a decade, Roper and
Atkins reversed their recent precedents. Imposing a categorical prohibition
in each instance, the Court noted that thirty states either prohibit capital
punishment altogether or prohibit it for the relevant category (the mentally

137. Id. at 593-96.
138. Id. at 596-600.
139. BANNER, supra note 128, at 131-32.
140. See Richard Reifsnyder, Capital Crimes in the States, 45 J. CRIM. L., CRIM. & POL.
SCI. 690, 691 (1955) (noting the eighteen states that, at the time, retained capital punishment
for rape). By the time Coker was decided, this number had been reduced to four. See supra
note 137 and accompanying text.
141. Article V provides:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a convention for
proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and
Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three
fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one
or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress . . . .
U.S. CONST. art. V.
142. Coker, 433 U.S. at 595-96.
143. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
144. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
145. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
146. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
147. See id. at 380 (finding neither a historical nor a modern societal consensus
forbidding the imposition of the death penalty for those who murder while aged sixteen or
seventeen).
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retarded and juveniles).148 Generalizing on the trends involving execution
of the mentally retarded, Atkins held that the practice “has become truly
unusual, and it is fair to say that a national consensus has developed against
it.”149
A similar premise underlies the Roper Court’s conclusion
concerning capital punishment for homicide committed by juveniles.150
But does either opinion provide evidence of a settled consensus?
Proponents of a living constitution might be willing to accept a recentlyreached consensus. Historicism, however, requires more, for otherwise
constitutional doctrine could be based on trends indistinguishable from
those underlying many legislative majorities. As if to signal their unease
with the conclusions reached in the two cases, the Atkins and Roper
majorities resorted to evidence not normally found in evolving standards
cases: public opinion polls concerning execution of the mentally
retarded151 and, in the case of juveniles, the fact that other countries have
discontinued such executions.152 Dissenting in each case, Justice Scalia
raised legitimate questions about whether the evolving standards test had
actually been satisfied.153 Coker, he noted, involved a much more decisive
and long-lasting consensus concerning the execution of rapists than the
Court was able to present for either of its recent decisions.154 Indeed, with
only thirty states and slightly more than a decade’s duration since a prior
decision, each case barely exceeded majority status and certainly did not
involve a period of sustained consensus.
At the very least, then, Scalia suggested, one could argue that the Atkins
and Roper majorities acted prematurely; they should have waited for a
more pronounced trend, one indicative of an enduring national
consensus.155 In Atkins, Scalia went even further. Ridiculing the
majority’s resort to public opinion polls, he awarded a prize for “the
Court’s Most Feeble Effort to fabricate a ‘national consensus.’”156 Scalia
148. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1185; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-15.
149. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316.
150. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1192-94 (noting general parallel between change in public
sentiment about execution of the mentally retarded and change in public sentiment about
execution of adolescents).
151. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21.
152. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1187.
153. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1217 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (voicing objections to the
Court proclaiming itself to be the sole arbiter of the Nation’s moral standards); Atkins, 536
U.S. at 341-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (advancing the proposition that Eighth Amendment
judgments regarding the existence of social standards should not appear to be the subjective
views of individual justices, but should be informed by objective factors such as statutes
passed by society’s elected representatives).
154. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1218 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
155. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1218 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[w]ords have no
meaning if the views of less than 50% of the death penalty states can constitute a national
consensus”); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 342-45 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (making a similar argument).
156. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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was of course accusing the majority of acting on personal preferences in
implementing the evolving standards test. Anything goes, he implied: if a
portion of the test is unsatisfied in a given case, the Justices employing it
then feel free to develop other criteria to reach their desired conclusion. It
would be disingenuous to argue that only historicism’s proponents can be
faulted on this score. As we have seen, originalism suffers from the same
problem of determining how much evidence is enough,157 but certainly
Scalia’s objections in Atkins must be taken seriously.
D. Originalist Historicism and the Punishments Clause
As I have suggested, unalloyed historicism makes no claim that the
ratifiers of a given provision intended it to be understood differently at later
times. Yet, one must certainly consider the possibility that the ratifiers
entertained this assumption at the time a given provision was adopted. If
the ratifiers of a provision understood it to have a dynamic meaning, one
could then point, if only for that provision, to a satisfying synthesis
between the two seemingly antithetical approaches to constitutional
interpretation. Unfortunately, this is the El Dorado of constitutional law: a
tantalizing prospect but one that ultimately cannot be justified. Before
seeing why this is so, let us first examine briefly some arguments based on
originalist historicism from modern judicial opinions.
There appears to have been only one occasion in which an opinion of the
Court actually endorsed originalist historicism. In Board of Regents of
State Colleges v. Roth,158 Justice Stewart declared for the Court that the
words “liberty” and “property” contained in the Fourteenth Amendment are
among the constitutional terms “‘purposely left to gather meaning from
experience.’”159 Two opinions that did not receive majority support but
that sustained judgments of the Court have embraced Eighth Amendment
originalist historicism. Concurring in Furman v. Georgia,160 Justice
Brennan cited Livermore to argue that the ratifiers did not intend “simply
to forbid punishments considered ‘cruel and unusual’ at the time.”161 More
than a decade later, Justice Stevens wrote an opinion for the four-person
plurality in Thompson v. Oklahoma162 that stands as the most ambitious
endorsement to date of originalist historicism by a member of the Court.
Stevens remarked:

157. See discussion supra Part I.B.
158. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
159. See id. at 571 (citing Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
160. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
161. Id. at 263.
162. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
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The authors of the Eighth Amendment drafted a categorical prohibition
against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments, but they made no
attempt to define the contours of that category. They delegated that task
to future generations of judges who have been guided by the “evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” In
performing that task, the Court has reviewed the work product of state
legislatures and sentencing juries, and has carefully considered why a
civilized society may accept or reject the death penalty in certain types of
cases.163

Stevens’s argument, it should be noted, contains not one but two highly
contestable claims. The first has to do with delegation. The Eighth
Amendment’s authors, he maintains, intended later generations to define
“contours” (I have used the term “scope” in this context) that they left
purposely vague.164 This is the essential thesis of originalist historicism.
However, Stevens’ Thompson argument adds another: that they thought of
“future generations of judges” armed with the power of judicial review
(Stevens’ Trop framework makes sense only if this power is assumed) as
their delegatees.165
Stevens maintains, in other words, that the
amendment’s ratifiers intended a Marbury-type system of judicial
interpretation of the Punishments Clause along historicist lines.166
That Weems and Trop established such a system is of course true.167 But
the question that must be asked here—the question that is essential
whenever an originalist claim is advanced—is whether there is substantial
evidence in the historical record to demonstrate that this is what the
ratifiers intended. The answer to this is no. It is not at all certain that the
ratifiers even intended to introduce a Marbury-type system of judicial
review. They may have anticipated some type of judicial review,
particularly of state legislation, but it is open to question whether they
intended the system of judicial supremacy over the state and federal
legislative action that developed in the wake of Marbury.168
This point, however, is less critical to Stevens’ position than his claim
that the Eighth Amendment’s ratifiers intended to delegate to future

163. Id. at 821-22; see Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1205 (2005) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (advancing the more cautious claim that Alexander Hamilton would have joined
Kennedy’s opinion if he were serving on the current Court).
164. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 822 (referencing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958)).
165. Id.
166. For an analysis of Marbury in its historical context, see Samuel R. Olken, The
Ironies of Marbury v. Madison and John Marshall’s Judicial Statesmanship, 37 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 391, 403-09 (2004).
167. See supra notes 97-113 and accompanying text.
168. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 143-44 (2004) (describing public and political sentiment in the
Marbury era).
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generations the job of defining its contours.169 To support this, Stevens
would have had to provide just the kind of evidence any originalist would
be expected to offer—a substantial compilation of eighteenth century
sources in support of his thesis plus a reasoned explanation as to why
contrary evidence should be discounted. Stevens offers nothing of the sort
in Thompson; he does not support his statement with even a single
historical citation. The one piece of evidence that Stevens might have
mentioned is Samuel Livermore’s caustic analysis of the clause when
Congress was debating it. Justice Brennan, it will be recalled, maintained
in his Furman concurrence that Livermore’s comments demonstrate an
awareness of the possibility that later generations might accord greater
scope to the clause than it was accorded in the eighteenth century.170 This
is true, but Livermore nonetheless cannot be said to provide any credible
evidence on behalf of Eighth Amendment originalist historicism. He was,
after all, an opponent of the Eighth Amendment; indeed, his remarks
indicate that he favored rejection of the amendment because of his fear of
what later generations might make of it.171 What an argument for Eighth
Amendment originalist historicism needs is a cluster of statements from its
supporters indicating that they wished it to be accorded greater scope by
later generations. The historical record contains nothing of the kind.
Originalist historicism, either in a limited Eighth Amendment sense, or
more broadly applied to other chronically vague constitutional provisions,
is thus a tantalizing prospect. If it could be supported by the usual
originalist methodology, it would heal many of the wounds of
contemporary constitutional debates. But no such support is available.
Unfortunately, originalist historicism is a false cure for a serious problem.
In the remainder of this Article, I reason in terms of unalloyed
historicism—that is, I rely on the assumption that historicism cannot be
supported by originalism.
II. THE KEY COMPONENTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORICISM: THE
PUNISHMENTS CLAUSE—AND BEYOND
Contemporary Punishments Clause jurisprudence is characterized by
subtly calibrated, gradual modification of doctrine that tracks changes in
the public’s settled convictions concerning specific types of punitive
practices. Historicism of this kind is a method of accommodation and
adjustment, one that honors an unchanging constitutional text while
applying that text to an increasingly large set of issues. This method is

169. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 822.
170. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 262-63 (1972).
171. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
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grounded in a normative premise that doctrine ought to be adjusted to take
into account enduring, widespread changes in fundamental values when
those changes are consistent with the direction charted by the framers. It is
grounded in the descriptive premise that judicial interpretation of the
Constitution’s chronically vague clauses has usually proceeded along these
lines. In this section, I consider the general characteristics of this type of
historicism. Some of the points I make are specific to Eighth Amendment
case law; however, I also discuss categories—for example, the notion of
time-bound rights and the importance of judicial candor concerning
interpretive method—that are relevant to constitutional historicism in
general. In canvassing Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, I thus take a first
step toward identifying the key elements of constitutional historicism as a
method for interpreting other portions of the text. My aim in this section is
analytic.
I address questions about the legitimacy of historicist
interpretation in the final part of the Article.
A.

Normative Commitment to Doctrinal Change

Constitutional historicism rests on a descriptive claim that doctrinal
change has tended to track changes in the settled convictions of the public
concerning values mentioned in the text. In some instances, it is essential
to back up this claim with carefully collected evidence, for the Court has
often been less than candid about the extent to which it has attempted to
capture shifts in settled convictions.172 Punishments cases, however, do not
require such subterranean exploration. Indeed, the stated purpose of
opinions that follow Trop is to capture accurately public attitudes toward
punishment.173 In examining legislative change and jury verdicts, a court
seeks to determine whether the public’s convictions have become firm
concerning the acceptability of a given type of punishment. Coker
illustrates this point quite well. The fact that all but four states prohibited
execution for rape and the further fact that the trend toward this extended
over decades, established that a consensus had formed concerning the
practice.174 It is indisputable, then, that Coker identified a well-settled
conviction of the modern era, one that is substantially different from the
convictions of the Eighth Amendment’s ratifiers.
Complementing the descriptive thesis is a normative one which holds
172. For an example of this in assistance of counsel jurisprudence, see infra notes 307323 and accompanying text.
173. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1195 (2005) (abolishing capital
punishment for offenders who were minors at the time of the crime); Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (abolishing capital punishment for offenders who are mentally
retarded); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977) (abolishing capital punishment in
cases of rape).
174. See supra notes 136-142 and accompanying text.

HEFFERNAN OFFTOPRINTER

2005]

2/24/2006 2:43:24 PM

CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORICISM

1389

that constitutional doctrine should be modified to reflect settled convictions
consistent with those of the ratifiers. One argument a historicist would
advance to support this has to do with the conception of the Constitution as
an intergenerational project in political and social liberty. This, however, is
only a general justification for historicism. In particular, as is made clear
by the formula just stated, historicists insist on (a) settled convictions that
(b) are consistent with value commitments of the ratifiers. The latter point
makes good on the notion of the Constitution as an ongoing project. Far
from advocating a “living constitution”—a body of doctrine created anew
for each generation—historicists focus on values inherited from the past.
The former point (about settled convictions in the present) underscores the
historicist’s focus on the meaning the current generation ascribes to the
text. An insistence on an enduring consensus establishes the supermajority element that, according to a historicist, justifies classifying a value
as constitutional. Once such a consensus exists, it is appropriate for courts
to adjust doctrine to reflect this. A historicist would justify Coker on these
grounds. Using the same framework, a historicist would also justify the
1970s application of the Equal Protection Clause to gender
discrimination175 and the 1960s acceptance of the argument that the Fourth
Amendment provides protection for privacy interests independently of its
protection for property interests.176 In each instance, earlier Supreme Court
rulings had rejected claims along these lines.177 A settled conviction
having developed against gender discrimination and in favor of privacy, the
historicist would maintain that it was proper for the Court to enlarge on the
ratifiers’ commitments and so refashion constitutional doctrine.
This normative argument distinguishes historicism not only from
originalism but also from a framework championed by Bruce Ackerman178
that can sometimes be mistaken for historicism. Consider first the obvious
difference with originalism. According to originalists, it is never proper to
modify constitutional doctrine to accommodate a change in settled
convictions, no matter how consistent that change may be with values
mentioned in the text. Article V provides the sole acceptable way to bring
this about, an originalist would contend.179 There is an obvious wisdom in
175. See infra notes 232-234 and accompanying text.
176. See infra notes 217-219 and accompanying text.
177. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 59-69 (1961) (rejecting a proposed
application of the Equal Protection Clause to include gender discrimination); Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 475 (1928) (rejecting the argument that the Fourth Amendment
protects privacy interests independently of property interests).
178. See generally 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991)
[hereinafter FOUNDATIONS]; 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS
(1998) [hereinafter TRANSFORMATIONS].
179. Compare Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 676 (1966) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the Court’s willingness to freely use the Equal Protection Clause and
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making Article V exclusive, an originalist would contend, for its methods
encourage careful deliberation by a wide portion of the populace. If
constitutional values actually are altered through Article V, the alteration
will occur in such a way so that popular deliberation will precede popular
consent.
Ackerman’s approach stands at a mid-point between originalism and the
historicism outlined in this article. On the one hand, Ackerman does not
insist on Article V as the exclusive means of altering constitutional
values.180 He maintains that Article V was bypassed in large measure by
the Reconstruction Congress of the 1860s and that it was wholly bypassed
during the New Deal crisis of the 1930s.181 Doctrine was profoundly and
properly modified at both times, he contends.182 This much is consistent
with historicism. However, Ackerman also maintains that doctrine can be
properly modified only if a “transformative agenda” is widely debated
during a “substantial period for mobilized deliberation”183—conditions
satisfied during Reconstruction and the New Deal but not at other times, he
suggests.184 Ackerman therefore insists on a deliberative alternative to
Article V: not the actual formalities mentioned in the text but a functional
equivalent of them by means of widespread consideration of the possibility
of constitutional change.185 On his account, it is only through, and at times
of, “constitutional politics” that doctrine can properly be modified.186 The
doctrines employed by the courts at other times—“normal politics” in
Ackerman’s terminology—must adhere to the changes wrought at the time
of constitutional transformation.187
In rejecting each of these approaches, a historicist would contend first
that neither one can make a strong claim to descriptive accuracy.
Originalists concede the point. As Henry Monaghan has noted, so much
the Due Process Clause to alter the original meaning of the Constitution and to question the
intent of the founders), with TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 178, at 77 (analogizing the
Constitution as a machine to which repairs may be made using a variety of tools, not all of
which were expressly suggested or even permitted for that purpose).
180. See FOUNDATIONS, supra note 178, at 15 (questioning whether the procedures
specified in Article V are merely sufficient, but not necessary, for amending the
Constitution).
181. Cf. id. at 195 (describing a shift in Constitutional interpretation away from pure
originalism and towards greater judicial activism).
182. See id. (legitimizing the decisions of New Deal judges not to adhere to strict
constructionism).
183. Id. at 263-65.
184. See id. at 81-130 (arguing that American constitutional history can be characterized
as “on constitution, three regimes”: an early, antebellum republic, a middle republic, and a
post-New Deal republic).
185. See id. at 264 (describing the significance of engaging in a critical examination of
both past and future constitutional interpretation).
186. See id.
187. See id. at 265 (defining periods of normal politics as those in which private citizens
behave passively, allowing political figures to speak for them).
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constitutional doctrine has departed from original understandings that any
attempt to revive them all would amount to a greater revolution in
constitutional law than anything experienced in the last two hundred
years.188
Ackerman, in contrast, makes no concession on this score; indeed, he has
made a substantial effort to show that decisions such as Brown v. Board of
Education189 and Griswold v. Connecticut,190 while concerned with issues
that have no direct connection to the New Deal crisis, are nonetheless
justifiable in light of Roosevelt’s transformative agenda.191 But far more
than two cases would have to be canvassed to establish this point. Since
the New Deal (according to Ackerman, the most recent instance of
constitutional politics),192 the Court has extended the reach of equal
protection to include gays as well as women,193 endorsed privacy as a core
constitutional value,194 provided substantial protection for the possession
and dissemination of pornography,195 reviewed aggressively the boundaries
between church and state196—and, of course, modified substantially the
scope of the death penalty.197 None of these developments can readily be
placed in the framework of the New Deal agenda. By contrast, the very
timing of each suggests that they can all be understood in terms of a
gradualist judicial response to changes in specific settled convictions.

188. See Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 723, 724-39 (1988) (concluding that originalism is a fundamental and effective
method of protecting and preserving political stability).
189. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
190. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
191. See FOUNDATIONS, supra note 178, at 150-59 (describing the ideological conflict
between the principles of New Deal activism and the founders’ emphasis on personal
liberties).
192. See id. at 89 (arguing that “the Constitution was revolutionized yet again in the
cauldron of the Great Depression”).
193. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-36 (1996) (holding invalid an
amendment to the Colorado state constitution prohibiting government action that intends to
protect against discrimination based on sexual orientation); Frontiero v, Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 691-92 (1973) (rejecting a policy that awarded financial benefits to wives of
servicemen, but not to husbands of servicewomen).
194. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (holding that the
government violated the defendant’s privacy rights by using a wire tap to listen to his
telephone conversations).
195. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973) (rejecting the “without
redeeming social value” test as a constitutional standard for obscenity); Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557 (1969) (prohibiting the criminalization of mere private possession of
pornography).
196. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 611-25 (1971) (challenging the
constitutionality of state aid to parochial schools); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 226-27 (1963) (holding that daily Bible readings in public schools violate the
Establishment Clause); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 436 (1962) (holding that public
school prayer violates the Establishment Clause even if children are excused from
participation if their parents object to the practice).
197. See supra notes 115-120 and accompanying text.
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Ackerman’s thesis, I suggest, stands as a special instance of the more
general type of historicism I have outlined. Catastrophes of American
constitutional history (Ackerman is surely right in limiting this category to
the Civil War and the New Deal198) can indeed exert a profound influence
on doctrine. These catastrophes do not, however, determine the course of
all, or perhaps even most, doctrinal change during times of “normal
politics.” Indeed, the gradualism of Punishments Clause jurisprudence
provides a telling counterexample, for this involves no one great cataclysm
but rather a series of modest shifts in public sentiment that are then
registered through equally modest recalibration of doctrine.
In challenging both originalists and Ackerman-type catastrophists on
normative grounds, a historicist would maintain that the method of
accommodation and adjustment ensures the ongoing consent that sustains
the legitimacy of the Constitution. By focusing on understandings that are
increasingly remote from the present, the originalist robs the Constitution
of the vitality it can (and does) possess as the organizing document for the
continuous project of political liberty. And by focusing only on
understandings arising out of catastrophe, Ackerman turns the Constitution
into a trauma-avoiding institution rather than one that furthers the complex,
subtle values associated with life during normal politics. A historicist
would thus contend that it is proper for courts to consider changes in settled
convictions—as evidenced, say, by substantial modification of penalties by
state legislatures and juries—even though those changes are not the result
of direct deliberation about whether it is desirable to alter the values of the
framers. To insist on a greater degree of deliberation, the historicist would
maintain, would be to ignore the extent to which the abstract values
mentioned in the text permeate everyday life—and so to ignore the extent
to which there are occasions for deliberation about constitutional values
that do not involve formal reflection on constitutional history but that are
nonetheless informed by concerns with an identifiable connection to those
of the ratifiers. This point holds true, a historicist would suggest, with
respect to all the instances of gradualist change mentioned earlier. It is
applicable to deliberations about gender discrimination, which in turn build
on discussions of race; to deliberations about privacy, which build on
(while subtly modifying) older frameworks for thinking about property;
and of course to deliberations about punishments, where notions about
what is acceptable have been the subject of robust discussion throughout
198. See, e.g., FOUNDATIONS, supra note 178, at 195 (commenting about both eras and
omitting references to other periods in the nation’s history: “During both Reconstruction
and the New Deal, the Court recognized that the People had spoken even though their
political leaders refused to follow the technical legalities regulating constitutional
amendment.”).
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the nation’s history. Self-conscious reflection about the gap between past
and present may be rare, the historicist would maintain, but this is not
critical given the occasions routinely presented for considering the
significance of the abstract values mentioned in the text.
B. The Direction of Doctrinal Change:
Enlargement, Contraction, and Transformation
Punishments cases involve a straightforward direction of change: they
enlarge on understandings that prevailed at the time of the Eighth
Amendment’s ratification. The same can be said about some of the other
examples of doctrinal change just discussed: invocations of the Equal
Protection Clause to cover gender discrimination and invocations of the
Fourth Amendment to accord independent standing to privacy interests also
enlarge on original understandings.199 But contraction is possible as well.
Think, for example, about the fate of the Contracts Clause200 as well as the
eclipse of the doctrine of freedom of contract.201 Contraction can be
combined with enlargement through a process of doctrinal transformation.
Indeed, the resolution of the New Deal crisis is perhaps best understood in
terms of a shift in which the Court sought to protect liberty through an
enlarged conception of non-economic rights while contracting the range of
protection of property and a diminished concern for federalism.202
A helpful guide to the issue of the direction of change can be found in
John Henry Newman’s analysis of the development of Christian doctrine,
an analysis he undertook in conjunction with his conversion from
Anglicanism to Roman Catholicism.203 It was Newman who introduced the
distinction between enlargement and transformation (he used the term
“metamorphosis”) of doctrine.204 Enlargement, Newman suggests, starts

199. See id. at 196 (maintaining that these shifts in interpretation are examples of
“successful constitutional politics”).
200. See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT:
A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 115-16 (2d ed. 1998) (analyzing the
declining importance of the Commerce Clause in twentieth century Supreme Court
decisions).
201. See id. at 127 (recognizing a parallel trend in the Supreme Court’s deference to
freedom of contract).
202. Compare United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 n.4 (1938)
(Stone, J.) (assigning an enlarged role to non-economic rights), with United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1941) (Stone, J.) (assigning a limited role to the Tenth Amendment).
See also TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 178, at 361 (examining the “swing” Justices’
concern for creating the appearance of “doctrinal continuity” even as the Court both
expanded and limited its protection of traditional rights).
203. See CHARLES F. HARROLD, JOHN HENRY NEWMAN: AN EXPOSITORY AND CRITICAL
STUDY OF HIS MIND 71-90 (1945) (analyzing the role that Newman’s study of doctrinal
development played in his conversion to Catholicism).
204. Id.
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with a core commitment that is never abandoned.205 “Its beginnings are no
measure of its capabilities, nor of its scope” Newman remarks.206
Gradually, a value covers more ground, remaining vital through expansion.
On Newman’s account, metamorphosis involves transformation—the
“recasting of doctrines into new shapes,” as he puts it.207 Within a body of
doctrine handed down from generation to generation, this will typically be
characterized by a reordering of values, with a previously subordinate value
being given priority over others that had eclipsed it, and with the entire
reordering characterized as an improvement on an ongoing tradition.208
Metamorphosis/transformation is thus marked by simultaneous
enlargement and contraction.
It is a considerably more complex
phenomenon than enlargement or contraction when each stands alone.
Punishments Clause jurisprudence provides a helpful introduction to
constitutional historicism in part because it offers an example of
enlargement at its most straightforward. But while the enlargement at stake
here is easy to understand, its relationship to underlying social trends is by
no means so simple. It is surely not the case, after all, that public attitudes
toward punishment have invariably become less severe. For example,
during the last three decades or so, many jurisdictions have increased the
205. Id.
206. JOHN HENRY CARDINAL NEWMAN, AN ESSAY ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHRISTIAN
DOCTRINE 40 (Longmans, Green, & Co. 1909) (1845), available at
http://www.newmanreader.org/works/development/. The relevance of Newman’s essay to
the study of constitutional doctrine is now commonly asserted in academic writing. See
JAROSLAV PELIKAN, INTERPRETING THE BIBLE AND THE CONSTITUTION 120 (2004)
(concluding that Newman’s theory of development of doctrine is no longer limited to the
study of religious history and doctrine); Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37
STAN. L. REV. 1, 8 n.26 (1984) (contextualizing Newman’s theories and emphasizing
Newman’s belief that fundamental traditions gave meaning and weight to subsequent
interpretations of Christian doctrine). It must be emphasized, however, that Newman’s
approach is no more than suggestive for the study of constitutional law. This is because
Newman adhered to a metaphysical distinction, which is inimical to secular thought,
between true development and false (or corrupt) development. See NEWMAN, supra, at 199.
True development of doctrine is possible because, on the one hand, no one human mind is
capable of grasping the full import of revelation. Id. at 29-30. On the other hand, such
developments “were of course contemplated and taken into account by [their] Author, who
in designing the work designed its legitimate results.” Id. at 75.
207. JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, 1 ESSAYS CRITICAL AND HISTORICAL 288 n.5 (1871), quoted
in HARROLD, supra note 203, at 75. Newman, it should be emphasized, does not endorse
metamorphosis of doctrine; rather, he views it as a form of corruption. This is consistent
with his conception of true development of doctrine as fulfillment of the “Author’s” design
of “legitimate results.” See supra note 163. It is appropriate, however, for a secular study
of the development of constitutional doctrine to use both Newman’s categories (enlargement
and metamorphosis/transformation) and to use them without the evaluative premises
Newman attached to them (enlargement as true development; metamorphosis/transformation
as corrupt development). Once shorn of the metaphysical premises Newman employed,
each category proves helpful in charting different patterns of doctrinal development in
constitutional law.
208. See HARROLD, supra note 203, at 75-76 (praising religious doctrine as a collection
of living ideas, which develops by building on its original tenets).
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punishment tariff for a wide variety of crimes.209 The Trop framework,
while according constitutional standing to trends towards lenity, does not,
however, provide any support for this converse trend toward severity.
Indeed, Trop-based decisions establish a baseline that can readily be raised
but that can be reduced only with great difficulty. Given the Court’s power
under Marbury to override legislative choices,210 enlargement on the scope
of the Punishments Clause has functioned as a kind of ratchet within the
democratic system. Absent a constitutional amendment or a decision
overruling a prior one, an opinion that expands on the scope of the
Punishments Clause redefines the context for democratic decisionmaking.211 Public sentiment concerning punishment may turn more severe,
but the Marbury ratchet establishes a minimum (which has gradually been
elevated over the course of the nation’s history) below which legislatures
may not go.212
That so many Eighth Amendment opinions and so many opinions
enlarging on the scope of other rights are nonetheless accepted as
legitimate is an indication of the powerful attraction exerted by
unidirectional historicism. In using the Marbury ratchet to mark off certain
practices because they offend settled convictions, the Court has employed
constitutional law to chart a national narrative of moral progress. The
Whiggish invocation of progress in Trop thus does not appear by
coincidence. The numerous decisions that have enlarged on the ratifiers’
original understandings213 are properly understood as instances of judicial
Whiggism.214 These decisions are premised on the notion that the national
209. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 45663 (1993) (discussing the connection between the increasing punishment tariff and
corruption and error in the criminal justice system).
210. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (stating that it is “the very essence
of judicial duty” to determine whether a statute conflicts with the Constitution and
concluding that when such a conflict is found to occur the statute cannot be followed).
211. See HARROLD, supra note 203, at 76 (grappling with Newman’s concept of
enlargement, and likening it to a system of “organic growth” in which the original idea is
both preserved and expanded).
212. In writing for himself and Chief Justice Rehnquist in Harmelin, Justice Scalia
asserted that “[t]he Eighth Amendment is not a ratchet, whereby a temporary consensus on
leniency for a particular type of crime fixes a permanent constitutional maximum, disabling
the States from giving effect to altered beliefs and responding to changed social conditions.”
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 990 (1991). My remarks in the text indicate my
disagreement on this point. I agree that the amendment should not function as a ratchet of
any kind for a temporary consensus concerning a given type of punishment; however, I
maintain that it properly functions as an almost complete ratchet once a long-lasting
consensus has emerged.
213. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) (citing Charles Warren, The
New Liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV. L. REV. 431 (1926)). Justice
Cardozo explicitly invoked the notion of enlargement in discussing the liberty protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment. That liberty, he asserted, “has been enlarged by latter-day
judgments to include liberty of the mind as well as liberty of action.” Id.
214. See generally John Paul Stevens, The Bill of Rights: A Century of Progress, 59 U.
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narrative should be understood, at least in part, in terms of an unfolding of
the domain of strongly embedded individual rights.215 An appeal to
progress does not necessarily involve an end-state of national development.
Nor must it involve a uniform pace of change.216 Rather, what is at stake
here is a notion that the threshold of minimally acceptable government
conduct is gradually becoming more stringent. This is the unmistakable
implication of Trop-type cases as well as numerous other ones that enlarge
on original understandings.
How, then, are we to understand clauses that, through less expansive
readings, have been involved in transformative judicial decision-making?
A historicist would maintain that a transformation is justified if, on balance,
it has furthered the aims of individual liberty. It could be argued, for
example, that the reordering of values in the wake of the New Deal crisis
had this effect. The subordination of property rights and the subsequent
upward valuation of privacy rights can arguably be justified in light of the
development of a more egalitarian liberalism than the one that prevailed in
the eighteenth century. On this account, property rights were one of the
defining features of an early modern liberal individualism that not only
made it possible for persons to define themselves independently of the state
but also facilitated radical differences in wealth.217 Privacy rights, it could
be maintained, also make possible independent self-definition.218 Unlike
property rights, however, they do so in a more egalitarian fashion since
differences in resources are less critical to privacy claims than they are to
those involving property.219 Whether this is an ultimately persuasive
CHI. L. REV. 13 (1992) (providing a (judicial) narrative constructed along these lines).
215. See id. at 20 (describing the development of individual rights through the gradual
expansion of the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses).
216. In his Roper concurrence, Justice Stevens stated that “[i]n the best tradition of the
common law, the pace of that evolution [under the Trop test] is a matter for continuing
debate; but that our understanding of the Constitution does change from time to time has
been settled since John Marshall breathed life into its text.” Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct.
1183, 1205 (2005) (Stevens, J., concurring).
217. See, e.g., JAMES MADISON, Property, in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF
THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 186, 186-88 (M. Meyers ed., rev. ed. 1981)
(equating “rights of property” with “property in rights” and condemning a system that
would value and protect the former more strictly than the latter).
218. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (“[T]he
most intimate and personal choices . . . are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”).
219. See Luke M. Milligan, Note, The Fourth Amendment Rights of Trespassers, 50
EMORY L.J. 1357, 1371-74 (2001) (discussing instances in which state and federal courts
have concluded that squatters on government-owned property have legitimate expectations
of privacy in their residences). See generally United States v. Sandoval, 200 F.3d 659 (9th
Cir. 2000) (holding that a search of a tent on land belonging to the Bureau of Land
Management and near a marijuana field violated the Fourth Amendment); Walls v. Giuliani,
916 F. Supp. 214 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that squatters living in buildings that the city
later acquired during tax foreclosure proceedings were entitled to a degree of privacy);
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justification for the profound doctrinal transformation in the concept of a
private sphere that occurred in the mid-twentieth century is, of course, an
open question. All that needs to be noted here is that transformation
(contraction of some rights and related enlargement of others) can also be
placed in the historicist framework.
One other feature of transformation merits attention in this context.
Because transformation requires the overruling of past doctrine and so
requires rejection of rules on which at least portions of the public have
come to rely, a historicist would concede that convictions in favor of
change must be deeply settled before a transformation is undertaken. This
concession, it should be noted, provides a helpful way to incorporate
Ackerman’s focus on catastrophic upheavals into the more general
framework outlined here. Because Reconstruction and the New Deal crisis
of the Court both involved the rejection of prevailing institutional doctrine,
political institutions at each time in the country’s history were particularly
attentive to questions about the depth of public convictions supporting
fundamental change.220 Indeed, it is in contexts such as these that selfconscious deliberation about the relationship of past values to present
ones—not necessarily the precise form of deliberation outlined in Article
V, but at the very least an extended public debate about the desirability of
change—is essential. Enlargement does not require such extensive
deliberation. It extends trends that already exist and is appropriately
validated by less systematic processes—by occasions for deliberation
(think, for example, about the Court’s concern for legislative decisions and
jury sentencing in death penalty cases)221 that cumulatively affirm ongoing
trends but that do not necessarily involve reflection on the relationship
between those trends and past values. On this account, historical
catastrophism can be viewed as a special instance, one requiring more
thoroughgoing deliberation, of the more general analysis provided here.
C. Time-Bound Rights (and Powers)
It is an essential feature of any kind of constitutional historicism—
whether the gradualist type found in Eighth Amendment case law or the
transformative version emerging from the New Deal—that rights and
powers are framed in time-bound terms. This is not simply a question of
arranging rights and powers according to the period in which they were
People v. Schafer, 946 P.2d 938 (Colo. 1997) (guaranteeing privacy to a person camping in
a tent on land that did not have postings about trespassing); State v. Dias, 609 P.2d 637
(Haw. 1980) (granting limited privacy to squatters living on government property).
220. See FOUNDATIONS, supra note 178, at 195 (“During both Reconstruction and the
New Deal, the Court recognized that the People had spoken even though their political
leaders refused to follow the technical legalities regulating constitutional amendment.”).
221. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
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announced. In speaking from an external perspective, one can note
differences between nineteenth and twentieth century Contracts Clause
cases222 or distinctions between pre- and post-New Deal Commerce Clause
decisions.223 The historicist, however, brings an internal perspective to
bear on these issues. If doctrine ought to be modified, though only under
the conditions just specified, then judges should endorse the modifications
of doctrine that have already occurred provided they conform to the
specified conditions. Judicial adoption of this approach would necessarily
mean that rights and powers should be modified over time: a right that was
properly denied at time A, for example, could be properly granted at time
B. Once again, Punishments Clause jurisprudence provides a helpful way
to consider these issues. We should begin by considering the dynamic rule
established in Trop. After that, we can turn to the issue of premature
historicist decision-making.
In his Furman concurrence, Justice Marshall remarked that under the
Trop framework “a penalty that was permissible at one time in our Nation’s
history is not necessarily permissible today.”224 An assumption implicit in
Marshall’s claim is that new Eighth Amendment rights can be generated in
the absence of a new rule. Generalizing on this, we can identify a
distinction between two different methods for altering doctrine: one by
resort to a dynamic rule, the other by resort to a static rule that replaces a
prior static one.225 Trop provides an example of a dynamic rule in
operation. If a certain kind of punishment is consistent with the public’s
settled conviction at one time but, at a later time, becomes unacceptable,
then a court can uphold it at the earlier time but reject it later while
appealing on both occasions to society’s standards of decency.226 The
dynamic rule itself suggests the possibility of change. Because it does, the
222. The contrast between different approaches to constitutional interpretation at
different times in American history provides the basis for the first four hundred pages of
PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING (4th ed. 2000). See id.
at 104-13 for the casebook’s treatment of different approaches to the interpretation of the
Contracts Clause, including a discussion of protection of property rights during the early
republic, and see id. at 415-26 for an examination of the effect of the New Deal revolution
on property rights protection.
223. In their survey of the history of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the authors of a
leading casebook entitle a section “The Evolution of Commerce Clause Doctrine: The
Lessons (?) of History.” GEOFFREY STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 189-205 (3d ed.
1996).
224. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 329 (1972).
225. See supra notes 100-105 and accompanying text.
226. Thus the significance of the Court’s remarks in Roper:
These considerations [an increase in the number of states prohibiting execution of
individuals committing crimes while seventeen or less] mean Stanford v. Kentucky
should no longer be controlling on this issue. To the extent Stanford was based on
review of the objective indicia of consensus that obtained in 1989, it is sufficient to
note that those indicia have changed.
Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1198 (2005).
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rule does not have to be jettisoned in the formulation of new rights.227
Alternatively, and more commonly, new rights can emerge from the
articulation of new static rules that reject prior static ones.
A
straightforward example of this is to be found in the Court’s repudiation of
its initial approach to gender discrimination. Bradwell v. Illinois228 was
just the first of many decisions that upheld state-sponsored discrimination
against women’s occupational choices.229 The trend continued well into the
twentieth century. In the 1948 case of Goesaert v. Cleary,230 for example,
the Court stated that the Constitution “does not preclude the States from
drawing a sharp line between the sexes” in determining which occupations
women can pursue.231 This is manifestly a static rule: in that it permits the
states to treat gender as a criterion for regulating occupational choice.
Only a quarter of a century later, the Court decisively repudiated this
approach, subjecting invidious discrimination against women to careful
judicial scrutiny. The approach taken in the 1970s was also static: all
classifications interfering with women’s interests were treated as invalid
unless the state could show them to be “substantially related to
achievement of . . . [important government statutory] objectives.”232 But
because this new rule is also static in nature, it stands in need of a dynamic
justification given the fact that it supersedes a prior static one. The
Frontiero plurality’s concession that “our statute books gradually became
laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes”233 is not
sufficient in this regard. Although a comment such as this indicates present
regret about the past, it fails to acknowledge the degree to which the settled
convictions of the present enlarge on those of the past. That the 1970s
Court was concerned with stereotyped images of women is understandable
in terms of a 1950s commitment to rectifying the effects of stereotyped
concerns about African-Americans.234 A dynamic justification for the rule
227. Furthermore, there is no need to say that the meaning of the Constitution changes
when the Court employs a dynamic rule such as the one contained in Trop. Justice Scalia is
thus mistaken in asserting in Roper that the significance of the Stanford/Roper sequence of
cases is that “the meaning of our Constitution has changed over the past 15 years—not,
mind you, that this Court’s decision 15 years ago was wrong, but that the Constitution has
changed.” Id. at 1217 (Scalia, J., dissenting). If, as the Trop plurality concluded, the Eighth
Amendment “draws its meaning from . . . evolving standards of decency,” Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958), then its meaning remains constant even as society’s standards
change, making it necessary for courts to adjust rights incrementally in response to those
changing standards.
228. 83 U.S. 130 (1872).
229. See id. at 139 (upholding the state’s decision not to grant a license to practice law to
a married woman).
230. 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
231. Id. at 466.
232. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
233. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973).
234. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954) (detailing current
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emerging from gender discrimination cases would acknowledge how
concerns about gender equality grew out of concerns about racial equality.
Bradwell was of a piece with Plessy. An avowedly dynamic justification
for Frontiero would have acknowledged not only the extent to which the
Court was enlarging on the premises of Brown but also, more generally, the
extent to which a nineteenth century concern with equality had been
enlarged one hundred years later.
Dynamic rules and static ones justified in light of dynamic
considerations are both methods for effectuating doctrinal change. A
historicist’s defense of each method relies on the distinction between
abstract statements of principle and concrete specifications of individual
rights. Think first about this distinction as it applies to moral, rather than
legal, rights. There is no doubt that moral propositions are usually
propounded in atemporal terms: “avoid cruelty,” for instance, or “treat like
cases alike.” Moral judgments about specific cases, on the other hand, are
not resolved merely by resort to abstractions. Once “avoid cruelty” is
considered in light of a concrete issue—how to punish rape, for example—
it is entirely appropriate to consider time-bound sentiments about cruelty in
determining how to resolve the issue. “Avoid cruelty” may be timelessly
valid, but this can be maintained while also maintaining that a
determination of what constitutes humane punishment for rape should take
into account contemporary notions about the proper scope and purpose of
punishment. When applied to a specific punishment, “avoid cruelty” can
thus become “at present, it is believed cruel to execute rapists.” As far as
gender discrimination is concerned, “treat like cases alike” can become “at
present, occupational discrimination based on gender is considered
impermissible.” Carefully qualified, specific judgments such as these
concede the influence of present values in the formulation of policy while
nonetheless drawing on moral principles of protean generality.
When we consider the Constitution as a legal document, we can see that
historicism offers an interpretive method that mediates between abstract
norms and the specific convictions of the present. In maintaining that
judgments about particular practices—the punishment of rapists, for
example—are properly time-bound, the historicist accepts the legally
binding character of abstract principles but contends that settled
convictions about the proper scope of those principles should guide courts
in determining the outcome of concrete cases involving those principles.
The possibility of mediating between abstraction and concreteness is of
urgent importance for the interpretation of general statements of human
rights. Because such statements are rarely revised, incremental adjustment
research about the effects of racial discrimination on psychological development).
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of their scope provides a means of insuring their continued vitality in social
and political life.235 A historicist would maintain that this is a job for
which courts are particularly well suited. Judges are institutionally trained
to grasp both the ratifiers’ understanding of the scope of a particular
statement of right and the contemporary resonance of that statement.
Although other branches of government can and should perform this
mediating role as well,236 a historicist would contend that courts are
properly expected to take primary responsibility in this area.
What if the issue at stake is not the proper scope of an individual right
but rather the scope of a government power? The transformative
jurisprudence of the New Deal, for example, raised questions not only
about the scope of specific rights but also about federalism and
relationships between the coordinate branches of the federal government.237
In addressing this, a historicist would affirm that powers, like rights, can be
time-bound in nature. The power of the presidency has properly been
expanded since the New Deal,238 a historicist would maintain, and the
power of the states properly reined in,239 with genuine deliberation of the
235. In this respect, though certainly not in others, Ronald Dworkin’s writings on the
Constitution take on overtones of historicism. Consider, for example, the weight of the
adverb “now” in Dworkin’s argument for the abolition of the death penalty. See RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 135-36 (1977) (“Can the Court, responding to the
framers’ appeal to the concept of cruelty, now defend a conception that does not make death
cruel?”). It would be hard to make sense of Dworkin’s position here without attributing to
him the claim that the abstract prohibition of cruelty contained in the Eighth Amendment
now takes a special form given current moral judgments about capital punishment. His
remarks on Plessy and Brown are also understandable in this vein. See RONALD DWORKIN,
LAW’S EMPIRE 387 (1986) (reasoning that the nineteenth century rationale for equal
protection possibly “would have been adequate under tests of fairness and fit at some time
in our history; perhaps it would have been adequate when Plessy was decided. It is not
adequate now, nor was it in 1954 . . . .”). The “now” in the final sentence and the specific
date (the year in which Brown was decided) unmistakably suggest an argument framed in
terms of time-bound rights.
236. How far Congress can go in interpreting the meaning of the Constitution is a matter
of considerable debate. In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), the Court stated
that Congress does not have the power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to
“restrict, abrogate, or dilute [its] guarantees” but implied that it has the power to enlarge on
judicial interpretations of Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at 651 n.10. The Court
rejected this analysis, however, in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 527-28 (1998).
At the very least, though, the Court has conceded the legitimacy of congressional factfinding that identifies violations of individual rights and seeks to prevent them. See id. at
518 (citing numerous cases in support of this proposition).
237. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941) (upholding Congress’s
authority to exclude goods from interstate commerce that were not produced in accordance
with specified labor standards); see also Wickard v. Fillburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942)
(expanding Congress’s Commerce Clause authority to include local, noneconomic activity
that has a cumulative effect on interstate commerce).
238. See Monaghan, supra note 188, at 737 (positing that modern presidents have
appropriated the legislative power that the Constitution of 1789 intended as Congress’s
domain).
239. See id. at 732-33 (arguing that Congress increasingly compels states to comply with
its policy objectives by attaching conditions to the states’ receipt of federal funds).
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kind Ackerman has described (deliberation nonetheless outside the scope of
Article V) having preceded these momentous changes.240 A caveat is
essential here, however, for the transformation wrought by the New Deal
involved substantial contractions of rights (particularly property)241 and
powers (in particular, those of the states)242 as well as enlargements of other
rights (noneconomic liberties)243 and powers (those of the federal
government).244 A historicist defense of this reshuffling would maintain
that it has produced a version of liberty better suited to an age of mass
communications and an era of egalitarian liberalism. Judicial opinions
have sanctioned the reordering of constitutional values but have touched
only superficially on the issues of political theory that must be addressed to
justify them. In remarking on this here, I note only that transformation of
this kind, while understandable in terms of the categories that inform
Eighth Amendment historicism (enlargement and contraction, time-bound
rights and powers), involves a question of assessment (concerning the
overall value of the rearrangement) that does not arise when enlargement
alone is at stake.
If rights and powers are properly time-bound in nature, the historicist
bears a burden, which an originalist need not confront, of explaining when
changes should occur. The burden is particularly heavy in cases where the
Court is enlarging a right or power. Given the near-ratchet effect of the
Court’s authority under Marbury, judicially sponsored enlargement
precludes legislative overruling of a Court decision.245 The Court’s death
240. See TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 178, at 324 (chronicling the public debate over
Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan that raged in assembly halls, newspaper articles, and over
the popular electronic medium of the time, the radio).
241. See ELY, supra note 200, at 120 (ushering in a period of social welfare that rejected
laissez-faire ideology and its respect for private property rights).
242. See id. at 128-29 (noting that Congress’s Commerce Clause authority even extended
to intrastate activities).
243. See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN:
THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 235 (1995) (“The Constitutional
revolution of 1937 altered fundamentally the character of the Court’s business . . . . After
1937, the most significant matters on the docket were civil liberties and other personal
rights.”).
244. In commenting on Court decisions of the late thirties and early forties, Robert G.
McCloskey noted that “[i]t was now evident that Congress could reach just about any
commercial subject it might want to reach and could do to that subject just about anything it
was likely to want to do, whether for economic, humanitarian, or other purposes.” ROBERT
G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 124 (4th ed. 2005). Decisions of the last
ten years, in particular, Lopez and Morrison, require a qualification of this judgment. See
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618-19 (2000) (considering the link between
gender-motivated violence and interstate commerce too attenuated); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 563-65 (1995) (rejection the notion that gun possession in a school-zone
impacts interstate commerce). It is by no means clear how extensively it has to be qualified,
however, given the extensive range of noneconomic activities Congress has previously
affected through deployment of its commerce power.
245. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 678 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(recognizing the “awesome power” of judicial review that allows the Court to bind
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penalty cases of the sixties and seventies illustrate how important it is to
avoid premature decisions when employing a historicist framework.246
Whereas death had been meted out to more than one hundred people per
year throughout the early part of the twentieth century, the figures for
executions dropped to double digits by mid-century. Indeed, in the midsixties, the figures were in the single digits.247 On an extrapolation
interpretation of Trop, one might have argued that the proper role of the
courts was to hasten change, not simply to confirm it. This is in fact the
position Justice Goldberg took in analyzing capital punishment. In a
memorandum to his colleagues written during the 1963 term, Goldberg
contended that the Court should not simply ratify what has already
occurred, but that it should quicken the pace of change.248 The Court,
Goldberg maintained, should “guide . . . public opinion in the process of
articulating and establishing progressively civilized standards of
decency.”249
We can call this the extrapolation version of constitutional historicism,
one that views the courts as a vanguard for social change. On this account,
one would maintain that if society were at point x ten years ago and is at x
+ 1 today, it is reasonable to suppose that not only will society be soon be
at x + 2, but that judicial authority should be used to accelerate its arrival at
this further point. Intriguing as this possibility is, and it is surely a model
with great appeal for those who want the courts to act as catalysts for social
change, the Supreme Court decisively, and properly, rejected it in the
Furman/Gregg250 sequence of cases decided in the decade following
Goldberg’s memorandum. In Furman, the Court invalidated certain
procedures for imposing the death penalty but did not repudiate the penalty
itself.251 It then responded favorably in Gregg to legislative action by the
states that adopted a bifurcated trial model for imposing the penalty.252

coordinate branches of government).
246. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 300 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(concluding that the progressive decline in the number of executions reflects society’s
misgivings about the death penalty).
247. See BANNER, supra note 133, at 244 (stating that in 1965 there were seven
executions in the United States).
248. See Arthur J. Goldberg, Memorandum to the Conference Re: Capital Punishment,
October Term, 1963, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 493, 499 (1986) (documenting the number of
countries that permit the death penalty and noting that the “worldwide trend is unmistakably
in favor of abortion”).
249. Id. at 500.
250. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman, 408 U.S. 238.
251. Furman, 408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring) (prohibiting the death penalty
in circumstances where there is an undue risk that death could be imposed “wantonly and
freakishly”).
252. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 191 (noting that evidence that is inadmissible during the guilt
phase of a trial might be helpful post-conviction in determining a rational sentence).
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Justice O’Connor’s comments in Thompson v. Oklahoma253 not only
emphasize the caution with which the Court employed its Marbury power,
but also the danger associated with extrapolation from historical trends.254
Her remarks are particularly worth citing because O’Connor has
consistently supported Trop’s evolving standards test.255 Writing as an
advocate of the test, she nonetheless warned against extrapolation to a yetto-be-reached consensus:
In 1972, when this Court heard arguments about the constitutionality of
the death penalty, statistics might have suggested that the practice had
become a relic, implicitly rejected by a new societal consensus . . . We
now know that any inference of a societal consensus rejecting the death
penalty would have been mistaken. But had this Court declared the
existence of such a consensus and outlawed capital punishment,
legislatures would very likely not have been able to revive it. The
mistaken premise of the decision would have been frozen into
constitutional law, making it difficult to refute and even more to
reject.256

On O’Connor’s account, there must be wide and long-standing societal
consensus in order to satisfy the Trop test. Trop does indeed allow for the
possibility of time-bound rights, but the new rights it anticipates must
emerge from settled convictions concerning the propriety of a given type of
punishment. Two considerations support this cautious approach. First, it is
not inevitable that social convictions will move toward greater lenity. A
properly conceived constitutional historicism should not embrace a theory
of inevitable change; rather, it should be concerned only with changes that
have already occurred. This point suggests the second reason why the
Court has properly rejected extrapolation analysis. Constitutional values
can be said to change only in relation to a baseline provided by deeply
rooted public convictions. A moralist might maintain that public
convictions on a given issue are inconsistent with some ethical imperative
the moralist has proposed. There are, for example, some commentators
who maintain that capital punishment is ethically impermissible under all

253. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
254. See id. at 850-51 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that that some legislative acts
are not the product of “deliberate decision making” by legislators, but simply the unintended
result of the interplay between statutes).
255. Even when writing in dissent, Justice O’Connor has affirmed her support for the
Trop framework. “It is by now beyond serious dispute,” she remarked in her dissent in
Roper, “that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ is not
a static command. Its mandate would be little than a dead letter today if it barred only those
sanctions—like the execution of children under the age of seven—that civilized society had
already repudiated in 1791.” Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1206-07 (2005)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting).
256. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 855 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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circumstances.257 But this is simply not germane to a historicism based on
society’s standards of decency. According to the model suggested by
Eighth Amendment historicism, new rights emerge not from the special
pleadings of bien pensants, but from the long-standing convictions of the
populace when those convictions are consistent with values adopted by the
ratifiers. On this analysis, Coker was rightly decided in 1977 and would
have been wrongly, because prematurely, decided in 1877. Atkins and
Roper, on the other hand, are contestable because they may well have been
premature. In neither case was the trend among states as wide as it was in
Coker; perhaps even more important, that trend was also not longstanding.258 In the paragraphs that follow, I assume for purposes of
argument that Atkins and Roper were properly decided under Trop. I do so,
however, only to consider a further issue related to time-bound rights, not
because Atkins and Roper can be classified as fully satisfactory on
historicist grounds.
The further issue to address here concerns the consequences for
individuals of judicial enlargements on rights, and it is because this issue is
so clearly at stake in the Penry/Atkins259 and Stanford/Roper 260 sequence of
cases that we must consider Atkins and Roper on the assumption that they
were properly decided. As noted earlier, historicists must entertain the
possibility that it is proper at one time to deny a party’s claim and proper at
a later time to grant an identical claim by a similarly situated party.
Originalism is free of the difficulties historicism encounters here. Even
when the Court overrules a prior decision, an originalist can maintain that
her rationale for doing so is timelessly correct: that the Court rendering the
first decision either misapplied originalism, or failed to apply it at all. An
originalist could never agree, for example, that it was proper to reject
Johnny Penry’s Eighth Amendment claim in 1989 and also proper to grant
Darryl Atkins’s essentially identical claim in 2002. This is exactly what
Trop permits. In fact, Justice O’Connor’s votes in Penry and Atkins

257. See, e.g., HUGO ADAM BEDAU, DEATH IS DIFFERENT: STUDIES IN THE MORALITY,
LAW, AND POLITICS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1987) (depicting the death penalty as arbitrary
and unreasonable through a series of essays).
258. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1193 (observing that five states abolished the death penalty
for juveniles between 1989 and 2004); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314-15 (2002)
(noting that fifteen states abolished the death penalty for the mentally retarded between
1989 and 2002); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 594 (1977) (explaining that, post-Furman,
only three states revised their criminal statutes to permit the death penalty for the rape of an
adult woman).
259. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317-21 (reversing Penry); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,
330-35 (1989) (holding that the Eighth Amendment does not forbid the execution of the
mentally retarded).
260. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1190-1200 (prohibiting the execution of offenders under
eighteen); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 377-80 (1989) (upholding the excution of
sixteen- or seventeen-year-old offenders).
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provide a telling example of the time-bound nature of Eighth Amendment
rights under Trop, for O’Connor wrote the opinion rejecting Penry’s
argument and joined the opinion accepting the one advanced by Atkins.261
The problem of equal treatment posed by historicism is thus easily
stated: two similarly situated parties may obtain diametrically opposed
results for identical rights claims advanced at different points in time.
Whatever the theoretical merits of historicism, a defender of its method
must confront the intensely practical problem of what remedies to offer a
party in Penry’s position.262 Justice Harlan is the member of the Court best
known for wrestling with the problem of justice in the domain of changing
rights. In a dissent he wrote during his final year on the bench, Harlan
acknowledged that “time and growth in social capacity” can legitimately
alter judicial understandings of constitutional rights.263 To illustrate his
theory Harlan cited the right of the indigent to appointed counsel, which
had been no right at all at the time the Sixth Amendment was adopted, but
a right established for federal criminal cases in 1937 and state cases in
1963.264 Clearly, though, Harlan’s concern can also be extended to the
Punishments Clause. His proposed resolution was to grant retroactive force
to all cases pending on direct review at the time a new right is announced
but to deny retroactive status to most cases where final judgment has been
entered. Interests of finality and federal-state comity, Harlan argued, weigh
heavily in favor of a refusal to revisit cases once final judgments have been
entered for them on direct review.265 The contemporary Court has adopted

261. Compare Penry, 492 U.S. at 340 (refusing to overturn a death sentence for a
mentally retarded defendant), with Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (prohibiting the execution of the
mentally retarded because it will not “advance the deterrent or retributive purposes of the
death penalty”).
262. The problem of equal treatment is critical because constitutional historicism does
not necessarily presuppose a historicized sense of justice. Historicists may of course adopt a
framework that historicizes morality. There is, however, no reason why they must do so
given their initial commitment to a historicized approach to the Constitution’s meaning.
Indeed, in citing the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, a historicist could
maintain: (a) that it gives legal force to a timelessly valid moral principle of similar
treatment for similarly situated parties, but (b) that the meaning of “similarly situated
parties” has been subject to enlarged interpretation by the courts and society at large during
the last century, embracing now (as it once did not) women and sexual minorities.
263. See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (contending that “in some situations it might be that time and
growth in social capacity, as well as judicial perceptions of what we can properly demand of
the adjudicatory process will properly alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural
elements that must be found to vitiate the fairness of a particular conviction”).
264. See id. at 694 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that
Gideon expanded the right to counsel to state criminal cases in 1968); see also infra notes
307-323 and accompanying text (discussing the historicist framework underlying the
Court’s opinions concerning the right of indigent criminal defendants to appointed counsel).
265. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308 (1989) (considering the interests of “comity
and finality” when determining the scope of habeas review); Mackey, 401 U.S. at 689-90
(emphasizing that finality is a fundamental goal of criminal litigation).
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Harlan’s position in large measure, both with respect to cases pending on
direct review and with respect to collateral review via habeas corpus.266
There is much to commend about Harlan’s carefully measured remedy
for the problem of changing rights. In the final analysis, though, it must be
deemed unsatisfactory, at least insofar as it is applied to serious
punishments such as the death penalty.
The Penry/Atkins and
Stanford/Roper sequences demonstrate why this is so. Under Harlan’s
approach, Johnny Penry and Kevin Stanford could properly be executed
even though Atkins later held execution of the mentally retarded
unconstitutional. This is manifestly unacceptable. Once a party has been
granted a reprieve on his life, other similarly situated parties are entitled to
similar treatment despite the interests associated with finality and
federalism. For litigants in Penry’s position, Harlan’s approach accords too
little weight to “time and growth in social capacity.”267 If these
considerations—the central features of constitutional historicism—are
treated as decisive in litigation in case A, then they should also be treated to
the subsequent revision of prior cases B and C. Johnny Penry and Kevin
Stanford, in other words, should not be executed now that Darryl Atkins
and Christopher Simmons have prevailed.
Should this line of reasoning be applied beyond the life-and-death issues
associated with capital punishment? Should it be applied, for example, to
gays who were convicted of consensual sodomy now that statutes
criminalizing this have been declared unconstitutional?268 Should it be
applied to civil actions in the wake of a ruling creating a new right
concerning, say, police use of deadly force?269 Absolute rules may well be
inadvisable in this context; at some point, Harlan’s insistence on
considerations of finality and federalism must be given substantial
weight.270 It is hard to see, though, why these factors should be treated as
decisive in the two instances just mentioned. When any criminal
conviction is at issue, the creation of a new right that would have made
conviction impossible had it been in force at the time of the original trial is
266. See United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 562 (1982) (applying Fourth
Amendment decisions retroactively to all cases on direct review that were not yet final at the
time the decision was rendered); Teague, 489 U.S. at 306 (refusing to apply new rules of
criminal procedure retroactively to cases on collateral review).
267. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
268. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (recognizing a liberty interest to
engage in “sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle”).
269. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (making it unconstitutional for a
police officer to shoot and kill an unarmed suspect unless there is probable cause that the
suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm to others).
270. See Mackey, 401 U.S. at 680 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(maintaining that lower courts should have discretion to apply federal constitutional
concepts despite the Supreme Court’s position as the ultimate arbiter of federal
constitutional law).
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an event of momentous importance, one that should entitle the original
defendant to invalidation of his conviction. Similarly, if a civil action
concerns something of life-and-death importance such as police use of
deadly force, then courts should reconsider actions brought by those who
were unable to benefit from a new rule. In at least these instances, and
perhaps in others, the balance must be struck in favor of newly announced
rights.
D. The Issue of Judicial Candor
If, as La Rochefoucauld maintained, “[h]ypocrisy is the homage that vice
offers to virtue,”271 then an ersatz originalism must be classified as the
tribute judges pay to genuine originalism in seeking to justify
nonoriginalist results. It is in this light that we can understand Justice
Brandeis’s celebrated claim that the “makers of our Constitution . . .
conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone—the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”272
No matter that the Constitution does not refer to a “right to be let alone.”
No matter that it also does not mention the word “privacy” (the key
component of Brandeis’s right to be let alone). No matter that property
rather than privacy dominated eighteenth century discussions of individual
rights that can be asserted against the state.273 To Brandeis, what was
critical was the attribution of intention to the “makers of our Constitution,”
for Brandeis could then project onto the ratifiers the values of a later
generation.
A historicist is concerned with the reverse question—that is, a historicist
asks about the risk judges run in admitting that the values implemented in
their opinions depart from those of the ratifiers. A few opinions of the
Court have been forthright on this score. In 1934, at the prelude to the New
Deal crisis, the Court in Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell 274
openly declared:
If by the statement that what the Constitution meant at the time of its
adoption it means today, it is intended to say that the great clauses of the
Constitution must be confined to the interpretation which the framers,
with the conditions and outlook of their time, would have placed upon
them, the statement carries its own refutation.275

271. FRANÇOIS LA ROCHEFOUCAULD, DUC DE, MAXIMS 73 (Louis Kronenberger trans.,
Random House 1959) (1665) (quoting Maxim 218).
272. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
273. Arthur Lee of Virginia remarked in 1775 that “[t]he right of property is the guardian
of every other right, and to deprive people of this, is in fact to deprive them of their liberty.”
See ELY, supra note 200, at 26 (quoting Lee).
274. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
275. Id. at 442-43. Responding to this, Justice Sutherland contended in his Blaisdell
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In 1966, the Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections276 Court remarked
that “[i]n determining what lines are unconstitutionally discriminatory, we
have never been confined to historical notions of equality . . . [n]otions of
what constitutes equal treatment for purposes of the Equal Protection
Clause do change.”277
But these are exceptions to a near-dominant pattern, one in which the
Court typically ignores, or at most obliquely acknowledges, of departures
from original understandings.
The contrast between Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s remarks in his judicial opinions and his comments in oral
argument before the Court underscores the extent of the taboos. When
writing for the Lopez majority, Rehnquist spoke only of “outer limits” in
Commerce Clause power but avoided the question of how far current rules
have departed from original understandings.278 In oral argument, on the
other hand, he has been less circumspect. While addressing attorneys in
Eldred v. Ashcroft,279 for example, he asserted, without any attempt at
qualification, that “what is happening in the country today in the way of
congressional [regulation]—under the Commerce Clause is totally different
than what the Framers had in mind, but we’ve never felt that was the
criterion.”280 The mask of originalist virtue is removed in these remarks,
though of course it should be added that a historicist would maintain that
no virtue is to be found in feigned adherence to the ratifiers’ intentions.
On this issue, as elsewhere, Punishments Clause opinions provide a
helpful guide for historicists. Trop-based decisions have consistently
adhered to the premise that it is permissible to enlarge on original
intentions when there is a long-standing, widely shared conviction
concerning a given type of punishment.281 Such opinions have not been
treated as illegitimate merely because the mask of originalism has been

dissent that a “provision of the Constitution . . . does not admit of two distinctly opposite
interpretations. It does not mean one thing at one time and an entirely different thing at
another time.” Id. at 448-49 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). A historicist must, in fact,
maintain such a position when discussing transformative jurisprudence. As noted in the
text, however, the more common form of historicism, which enlarges on original
understandings of vague provisions, holds simply that a provision can properly be accorded
greater scope as public understandings of its meaning expand.
276. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
277. Id. at 669 (emphasis added).
278. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 553-59 (1995) (canvassing prior
Commerce Clause jurisprudence and articulating three categories of activity which Congress
may regulate under its commerce authority).
279. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
280. Oral Argument Tr. at 20:11-15, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01618), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_
transcripts/01-618.pdf.
281. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (“[T]he Constitution
contemplates that in the end [the Court’s] judgment will be brought to bear on the question
of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment.”).
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removed. On the contrary, the Trop framework is among the most
enduring in constitutional law. In employing it, the Court has suggested
that constitutional norms derive their authority from patterns and practices
that are related to the text but that modify original understandings of its
meaning.282 This is not a proposition that has undermined respect for
judicial authority. Rather, it has enhanced the sense in which constitutional
interpretation is an intergenerational project, one in which judges do not
make law but instead respond to social changes consistent with values
established at the outset.
A textualist response to this defense of judicial candor merits special
consideration, for it could be maintained that the term “unusual” provides a
unique license for judicial appeals to changing convictions and practices.
The absence of the word in any of the other chronically vague provisions of
the Constitution, it could be contended, makes a similar approach
inappropriate elsewhere. But this point is convincing only if “unusual” is
placed in a naïve textualist framework and “cruel” is not, and there seems
to be no strong reason why both should not be read in the same way.
Assuming they are, then it is the resonance of “cruel” in public sentiments
about punishment that must be treated as critical to interpretations of the
clause, for it is this resonance that allows for changes in doctrine. By
analogy, it is the changing resonance of “equal” that justifies extension of
the Fourteenth Amendment to gender and sexual orientation discrimination,
the changing resonance of “search” that justifies extension of the Search
and Seizure Clause, and so on. In other words, the chronic vagueness of
“cruel,” not the peculiar word “unusual,” is the bridge between
Punishments Clause historicism and that of other provisions. Candor about
the connection between chronically vague terms and long-standing
practices is apt throughout constitutional law.
III. APPLYING THE CATEGORIES: TWO CASE STUDIES
Punishments Clause jurisprudence, I have suggested, provides a model
for understanding and defending historicist interpretation of the
Constitution’s chronically vague clauses. Eighth Amendment case law
does not, of course, offer the only way to carry out the historicist project. It
is committed to the progressive enlargement of individual rights whereas
historicist interpretation can also involve contraction or transformation.
Punishments Clause cases employ Trop’s dynamic rule whereas most
historicist decisions employ static rules that are susceptible to dynamic

282. See generally Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304 (2002); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977).
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justification.283 And punishments cases are marked by a rare degree of
judicial candor concerning their historicist foundations. In this section, I
examine two areas of constitutional doctrine in light of the general features
of historicism just outlined: Sixth Amendment decisions concerning the
right of indigent criminal defendants to the assistance of counsel and the
substantive due process opinions, in particular the Court’s opinion in
Lawrence concerning the scope of private life.284 My aim in each instance
is to show how the general points made earlier are applicable beyond the
Punishments Clause. In the first part of the section, I note that assistance of
counsel cases involve progressive enlargement of rights but that, unlike
Trop-based decisions, this has been effected by means of static rules and
with virtually no candor about the historicist underpinnings of the
conclusions reached. Lawrence involves a quite different configuration of
factors: a dynamic rule, an unusual degree of candor in justifying the
decision, and a decision that has been built on the Court’s ongoing
transformation of the nature of private liberty.
A.

The Right of Indigent Criminal Defendants to Assistance of Counsel

It is particularly helpful to begin with the Assistance of Counsel Clause
because it is in this area of law that Justice Black, an outspoken opponent
of what I have called historicism, can be seen nonetheless to have relied on
it. Black denounced the Court for ignoring the plain language of the Fourth
Amendment to create a right of privacy.285 He took an originalist position
on the death penalty, contending that because it was in common use at the
time the Eighth Amendment was adopted, it could not be judicially
invalidated.286 And he bitterly opposed the Harper Court’s position that
notions of equal protection can properly be expanded over time.287 Yet in
his decisions concerning the Sixth Amendment assistance of counsel
guarantee, Black took the same expansionist approach he rejected
elsewhere.288 Moreover, he did so without acknowledging the enlargement
283. See discussion supra Part II.C.
284. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571-72 (2003) (recognizing that adults have a
liberty interest in deciding how to “conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex”).
285. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 365 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting)
(asserting that the language of an amendment is the “crucial place to look” when
interpreting the Constitution).
286. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 226 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting)
(positing that judges act as legislators when they attempt to keep the Constitution up-to-date
through judicial interpretation).
287. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 675-76 (1966) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (contending that the Due Process Clause should not be construed as a “blank
check” to interpret the Constitution in a manner not originally conceived by the Framers).
288. James J. Tomkovicz has provided the following summary of the trend that
culminated in Black’s Johnson and Gideon opinions: “One consistent trend has been
evident from start to finish—the history of the right to counsel has been one of constant,

HEFFERNAN OFFTOPRINTER

1412

2/24/2006 2:43:24 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:1355

that he and his colleagues were bringing about. And of course, he provided
no dynamic justification for his results. As we shall see, though, Black’s
conclusion in Gideon v. Wainwright,289 his most prominent assistance of
counsel opinion, ratified a trend among the states in much the same way
that Coker later was to do so with respect to the death penalty.
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense.”290 This clause is not chronically vague in the sense that I have
previously used this term, for it does not suggest a wide range of possible
applications. Rather, it is best classified as “chronically ambiguous.” It
suggests not many, but two, possible conclusions concerning counsel: that
a court may not deny a criminal defendant the right to retain counsel if the
defendant wishes to do so (the retention interpretation) or that a court must
provide counsel for a criminal defendant (the provision interpretation). An
originalist would, of course, resolve this ambiguity by considering the
understandings of the ratifiers as manifested by their comments on the
Sixth Amendment and the practices that prevailed at the time of the
Amendment’s adoption. No comments have been reported concerning
their understandings.291 However, the practices of late eighteenth and early
nineteenth century courts point clearly to the retention interpretation.
Indeed, long after Black had succeeded in imposing the provision
interpretation on constitutional doctrine, an opinion by (then) Justice
Rehnquist conceded that this interpretation is historically dubious. “There
is considerable doubt,” Rehnquist wrote in Scott v. Illinois,292 “that the
Sixth Amendment itself, as originally drafted by the Framers of the Bill of
Rights, contemplated any guarantee other than the right of an accused in a
criminal prosecution in a federal court to employ a lawyer to assist in his
defense.”293
Important evidence of this original understanding is found in the First
Congress’s legislation dealing with treason. As William Beaney noted,
“there was no common-law precedent which called for the appointment of
counsel except in treason cases.”294 Congress followed just this approach

almost relentless expansion.” JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, THE RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 34 (2002).
289. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
290. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
291. See WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 23-24, 27
(1955) (contrasting the First Congress’s lengthy debate on proposed constitutional
amendments concerning the right to bear arms, freedom of speech, and religious freedom
with its near-silence on the proposed Sixth Amendment permitting the right to assistance of
counsel).
292. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
293. Id. at 370.
294. BEANEY, supra note 291, at 29.
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in its treason legislation, requiring provision of counsel at the request of a
treason defendant but otherwise not mentioning a right to provided
counsel.295 State court judges also endorsed the retention rather than the
provision interpretation of comparable state constitutional provisions.296
Only in the middle of the nineteenth century did state courts start to adopt
the provision interpretation for indigent defendants charged with felonies.
Indiana appears to have been the first to do so,297 and Wisconsin followed
suit soon afterwards.298 By the early twentieth century, many federal
district courts were taking the same approach. Despite the absence of a
statutory or constitutional mandate, many federal judges appointed counsel
for indigent defendants who faced serious criminal charges.299 Indeed,
when Johnson v. Zerbst,300 the case that established an indigent’s
constitutional right to counsel in a federal criminal trial for a felony,
reached the Supreme Court, the government conceded that “the practice has
become established on the part of the bench and bar to see that those
defendants shall not go unrepresented who, being indigent, and not electing
to defend in person, make a timely request and showing for the assignment
of counsel.”301
No reference to changing practices can be found in Black’s Johnson
opinion, however.
Black’s nod to history was at most oblique.
“Consistently with the wise policy of the Sixth Amendment,” he wrote, the
Court has emphasized “‘the humane policy of modern criminal law,’ which
now provides that a defendant ‘. . . if he be poor, . . . may have counsel
furnished him by the state . . . .’”302 The adjective “modern” and the adverb
“now” might be sufficient to alert the attentive reader to the expansion of
practice being effectuated by Black’s opinion. But Black’s “consistently”
at the beginning of the sentence might give pause to the reader inferring a
change in practice, for the clear implication of the sentence’s opening
295. See id. at 28 (arguing that if Congress had intended the Sixth Amendment to be a
radical departure from the Judiciary Act of 1789 it would have debated the implications of
the Amendment).
296. See id. at 21 (clarifying that the few states that made a provision for counsel did so
primarily in capital cases).
297. See Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13, 18 (1854) (stating that no defendant in a “civilized
community” should be without the assistance of counsel).
298. See Carpenter v. County of Dane, 9 Wis. 249, 251 (1859) (observing that “it is a
little like mockery” to promise an indigent defendant the right to a fair trial without
providing counsel).
299. See infra note 301 and accompanying text. But see Alexander Holtzoff, The Right
of Counsel Under the Sixth Amendment, 20 N.Y.U. L.Q. Rev. 1, 8 (1944) (conceding that
many federal courts did not provide counsel for defendants wishing to plead guilty).
300. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
301. Brief for United States at 26, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (No. 699),
quoted in BEANEY, supra note 291, at 29-30.
302. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 463 (quoting Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 308
(1930)).
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clause is that modern criminal law implements a humane policy established
by the ratifiers. In any event, in Johnson, Black otherwise relied on mere
assertion when dealing with the ambiguous words of the assistance clause.
Writing as if the text were clear on the point—as if the clause were similar
in nature to the one setting an age requirement for the presidency—Black
stated that the “Sixth Amendment withholds from federal courts, in all
criminal proceedings, the power and authority to deprive an accused of his
life or liberty unless he has or waives the assistance of counsel.”303
Johnson thus established a static rule, but failed to note its inconsistency
with original understandings of the Amendment, and so, of course, did not
provide a dynamic justification for the rule it announced.
Nonetheless, two different dynamic justifications are readily apparent for
Johnson’s rule. One is specific to practices in federal courts. As noted,
even the government conceded that, in the decades preceding Johnson,
federal trial judges had increasingly tried to make sure that felony
defendants were provided with the assistance of counsel.304 The Johnson
rule can thus be justified as a codification of changed practice: as an
adoption of the settled convictions of those implementing the “humane
policy of the modern criminal law.”305 The other justification is more
general in nature. In establishing a right to provision of counsel, Johnson
posits a claim that can be advanced for affirmative government aid.
Guaranteeing a right to retain counsel posits a claim to negative freedom—
a claim to be free of government interference in this regard. In contrast,
because the Johnson right can be implemented only by affirmative
government action, it provides a judicial parallel to the social-welfare
conception of the state that was central to the New Deal. To put the point
in language congenial to New Dealers, Johnson created a system of “legal
social security” for federal felony defendants.306 In arguing for this as a
constitutional justification, a historicist could maintain that the settled
convictions emerging from the New Deal crisis of the Court made
legitimate an enlargement on the ratifiers’ understandings, one that
endorsed the New Deal’s conception of the government as a guarantor of a
limited range of positive rights designed to promote the basic needs of
individuals.

303. Id.
304. See supra note 301 and accompanying text.
305. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 463 (quoting Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 308
(1930)).
306. See William C. Heffernan, Social Justice/Criminal Justice, in FROM SOCIAL JUSTICE
TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE: POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 47, 59
(William C. Heffernan & John Kleinig eds., 2000) (analogizing the provision of counsel for
indigent defendants to state welfare programs such as Medicaid, food stamps, and housing
vouchers).
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This latter point helps us understand the timing of the next stage of Sixth
Amendment enlargement. Shortly after Johnson, in Betts v. Brady,307 the
Court rejected the argument that indigent felony defendants in state courts
are constitutionally entitled to appointed counsel.308 The Court reversed
itself, however, two decades later in Gideon v. Wainwright.309 Black
dissented in Betts310 and wrote the Court’s opinion in Gideon. In both
instances, he reasoned in terms of a timeless right for the indigent, with no
acknowledgement of changes in convictions about the government’s role in
protecting the poor.311 But the record of historical change on this is clear if
one goes beyond Black’s written opinions. In 1942, when Betts was
decided, thirty states provided indigent felony defendants with the
assistance of counsel.312 By the time Gideon reached the Court, this
number had increased to forty-five.313 Although Black’s opinion makes no
reference to this change, his conclusion in fact ratifies state practice in
almost exactly the same way that Coker later would for the execution of
rapists.314 In both instances, the Court can be said to have been rounding
up the strays: it was insisting that the few remaining outlier states adhere
to a deep and long-standing consensus that enlarged on the ratifiers’
understandings. Gideon is thus a historicist decision without a historicist
apparatus of justification. It follows the principles of enlargement and
timing noted in the discussion of punishments cases—and needs only a
historicist rationale as a complement to this.
The Court extended the clause still further in Argersinger v. Hamlin,315
requiring states to furnish counsel to indigent defendants in misdemeanor
cases whenever imprisonment looms as a possible penalty.316 An
307. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
308. Id. at 472.
309. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
310. See Betts, 316 U.S. at 477 (Black, J., dissenting) (insisting that the promise of equal
justice under law is meaningless if a defendant is without the assistance of counsel).
311. Id. at 474 (“the Sixth Amendment makes the right to counsel inviolable by the
Federal Government. I believe that the Fourteenth Amendment made the Sixth applicable to
the states.”); Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342 (“We think that the Court in Betts was wrong . . . in
concluding that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of counsel is not” a fundamental right).
312. See Betts, 316 U.S. at 469-70 (noting that many states provided for the appointment
of counsel for certain offenses).
313. See LUCAS POWE, THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 380 (2000) (stating
that “Florida could gain the amicus support of only Alabama and North Carolina for its
claim that an accused could be validly convicted without the aid of counsel; Mississippi and
South Carolina were the only other states not offering counsel—hardly, especially in 1963, a
stellar lineup.”). It should be noted, by the way, that the lineup of states retaining the death
penalty was largely similar to the lineup of states that continued to criminalize consensual
sodomy. The trend toward the enlargement of rights in all three doctrinal areas has thus
been forged at the expense of the South.
314. See supra notes 136-142 and accompanying text.
315. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
316. See id. at 37 (recognizing that even a short period of imprisonment may result in
serious repercussions for the accused).
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Argersinger footnote canvassed state arrangements at the time of the
decision, noting that “[o]verall, thirty-one States have now extended the
right to defendants charged with crimes less serious than felonies”317—not
the overwhelming majority of states that supported Gideon and Coker,
instead a modest majority more akin to the one that prevailed in Atkins.318
Clearly, the trend was running out, a point the Court frankly discussed in
its opinion for the final case in the sequence, Scott v. Illinois.319 Scott,
which held that the Sixth Amendment does not require states to provide
counsel to indigent misdemeanor defendants who are not faced with the
prospect of prison,320 is replete with references to trend-lines. It asks
whether Argersinger should properly be considered “a point in a moving
line”;321 it notes that the problem of “constitutional line drawing becomes
more difficult as the reach of the Constitution is extended further”;322 and it
openly discusses the problem of extrapolation from “an already extended
line [of decisions].”323 Indeed, Scott, it seems fair to say, is grounded in a
historicist rationale against enlargement. Perhaps a settled consensus will
someday develop in favor of the right at issue in the case, but the Court
correctly discerned the absence of one at the time the case was decided.
We can summarize a thirty year sequence of cases by noting how textual
ambiguity is the starting point, but only that, for a cautious extension of the
scope of constitutional rights. At the beginning of the sequence, in
Johnson v. Zerbst,324 Justice Black treated the text as if it answered the
question of whether to provide indigent felony defendants with counsel.325
It of course does not, but Black was nonetheless able to capitalize on the
Sixth Amendment’s ambiguity to achieve his purpose. By the time the
sequence was completed in Scott,326 the text clearly could not serve as the
foundation for the Court’s conclusions, for the Sixth Amendment seems to
anticipate a categorical rule when it speaks of “all criminal prosecutions”327
while the Court’s actual rules concerning indigent criminal defendants
distinguish between those threatened with imprisonment and those who are
not.328
317. Id. at 27 n.1.
318. See supra notes 155-157 and accompanying text.
319. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
320. Id. at 373-74.
321. Id. at 369.
322. Id. at 372.
323. Id.
324. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
325. Id. at 462-63 (The Sixth Amendment “embodies a realistic recognition of the
obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect
himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty . . . .”).
326. Scott, 440 U.S. at 367.
327. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
328. Scott, 440 U.S. at 373-74.
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With the text relegated to the status of starting point, we can make sense
of the sequence only by focusing on a long-term trajectory of change,329
one that originates in a small number of nineteenth century state court
decisions and culminates in twentieth century conceptions of the state as a
guarantor of rights to affirmative aid. Because such rights impose serious
financial obligations, it is a matter of particular urgency to determine their
outer limits. For this reason, Scott’s repeated references to line drawing are
not surprising: once it was clear that a consensus did not exist concerning
further extension of the rights of indigents, the Court reverted to the
original understanding of the clause. But it did so only for those issues
where a consensus was absent. Thus it drew the line only after having
wrought a profound change in criminal justice. Taken together, its
assistance of counsel decisions can be said to have brought about just the
kind of enlargement endorsed by constitutional historicism.
B. The Reconfiguration of Private Liberty: Substantive Due Process in
Contemporary Constitutional Law
The Johnson through Scott line of opinions can be understood in terms
of a Whiggish trajectory of expanding liberty, one that parallels the
enlargement of rights found in punishments, gender discrimination, and
free speech opinions. But while this is the most familiar (and also the most
comforting) version of constitutional historicism, it is not the only one
possible. Constitutional rights can contract as well as expand. Indeed,
because most of the rights associated with the possession of property have
received less judicial support from the New Deal on, the question that must
be asked in this context has nothing to do with contraction (it is clear, after
all, that property rights have received diminished protection);330 rather, one
must ask whether the modern Court’s analysis of private liberty in
noneconomic terms—in particular, its tendency to treat privacy as the axial
concept of personal liberty331—can be defended as a legitimate
transformation (contraction of one cluster and enlargement of a related
cluster) of the ratifiers’ conception of the realm of personal freedom. This
329. See TOMKOVICZ, supra note 288, at 36 (observing that “[f]or over 300 years, the
history of the right to counsel was one of consistent growth”).
330. As James Ely has noted, “[b]y separating property rights from individual freedom,
the [Court] . . . instituted a double standard of constitutional review . . . [affording] a higher
level of judicial protection to . . . personal rights, [while] economic rights were implicitly
assigned a secondary constitutional status.” ELY, supra note 200, at 133.
331. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)
(reiterating that the “law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education”);
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-20 (1984) (stating that the “Bill of Rights is
designed to secure individual liberty,” including the right to enter into certain types of
personal relationships without state interference).
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question also has Whig overtones, but it can be approached from other
perspectives as well. For example, in discussing the modern ascendancy of
privacy over property rights, an originalist could charge the Court with
both a lack of fidelity to the ratifiers’ understandings and a resort to raw
judicial power in adopting personal preferences unrelated to those
understandings.332 On the other hand, a historicist could defend the Court’s
current approach to personal liberty as a modification of the original
conception of individual freedom that is understandable in light of an
egalitarian shift in convictions as to the nature of that freedom. This
portion of the section outlines a historicist justification of the Court’s
position along these lines.
There can be no doubt that the founding generation viewed property
rights as the touchstone of personal liberty. The Constitution’s text
contains no reference to privacy. The term “property,” in contrast, appears
twice in the Fifth Amendment.333 Moreover, when the adjective “private”
(as distinguished from the noun “privacy”) is used in the text, it is used to
modify the word “property” (“nor shall private property be taken for public
use without just compensation”).334 But we should not concentrate simply
on textual references to property, for the founding generation can also be
said to have shown a concern for the concept as it is broadly understood.
Consider, for example, the significance judges placed on the text’s
reference to “privileges and immunities”335 and its statement that contracts
shall not be impaired.336 Justice Washington’s widely-cited opinion in
Corfield v. Coryell337 maintained that among the “fundamental” privileges
and immunities of an individual is the “right [to] take, hold, and dispose of
property.”338 Justice Chase’s opinion in Calder v. Bull339 contended, with
no effort whatsoever to find a textual home for its assertions, that natural
law (which Chase apparently considered enforceable in federal courts)
prohibits “a law that destroys, or impairs, the lawful private contracts of

332. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 520-21 (1965) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Court may not invalidate laws enacted by federal and state
legislatures with which it does not personally agree and that doing so undermines the
separation of powers intended by the ratifiers).
333. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation.”).
334. Id.
335. Id. at art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (“The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges
and Immunities of Citizens of the several States.”).
336. Id. at art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any law . . . impairing the
Obligation of Contracts.”).
337. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
338. Id. at 552.
339. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
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citizens . . . or a law that takes property from A and gives it to B.”340 The
founding generation thus thought of property not simply as a reference
point for a specific set of rights but as the symbol of the gulf between civil
and political society. As Madison put it, the term “property” should be
understood in its broadest sense to refer to individuals’ “free use of [their]
faculties, and free choice of the objects on which to employ them” without
interference by the government.341
Once it is understood that property rights were seen as the bulwark for
civil society against the state, one can readily grasp how it is that
nineteenth century courts began to draw on the Due Process Clauses
contained in state and federal constitutions to ensure the vitality of personal
liberty. In 1856, for example, the New York Court of Appeals relied on the
state constitution’s Due Process Clause in asserting that “the legislature
cannot totally annihilate commerce in any species of property, and so
condemn the property itself to extinction.”342 Needless to say, due process
provides a peculiar textual basis for claims of this kind. A provision that
prohibits the taking of property without due process of law would appear
on its face to deal only with the procedural regularity of government action.
It certainly would not appear to establish an absolute barrier against
legislation. But from the nineteenth century onward, due process was
understood to have a substantive as well as a procedural component.
Moreover, that component was understood to be concerned with rights of
property as that term is broadly conceived.343
Perhaps the best-known property-based substantive due process case is
Lochner v. New York,344 the Supreme Court’s 1905 decision invalidating
legislation limiting a baker’s workweek to sixty hours within the state.345
Lochner is rooted in the claim (a familiar one by the early twentieth
century) that due process contains a substantive component. Building on
this, the majority opinion maintains that this component includes freedom
of contract and that New York’s legislation unreasonably interfered with a
baker’s right to regulate his hours of employment.346 Of special importance
for our purposes, however, is the formula Justice Holmes advanced in his
Lochner dissent for determining the scope of a substantive due process
claim. Holmes did not object in principle to the idea of substantive due
340. Id. at 388 (emphasis added).
341. MADISON, supra note 217, at 186.
342. Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 399 (1856).
343. See ELY, supra note 200, at 79-81 (elaborating that the concept of substantive due
process first appeared in the Dred Scott decision and flourished in the late nineteenth
century, especially in the fields of patent and copyright law).
344. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
345. Id. at 64-65.
346. See id. at 64 (insisting that law bore no direct relation nor had any substantial effect
upon a baker’s health which would outweigh the infringement of his freedom of contract).
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process. He did not claim, as one might given the typical use of the words
“substance” and “process,” that the very idea is an oxymoron. Rather, he
maintained that the notion of substantive due process should be understood
in light of America’s traditions. The word “liberty” contained in the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, Holmes asserted:
is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant
opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily
would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental
principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our people
and our law.347

Did Holmes thus think of substantive due process as being subject to a
dynamic rule? Did he believe that traditions can change and that, in
changing, fundamental principles from the past that at one time achieved
constitutional standing can be modified in light of new ones? It is quite
possible he did. Holmes is particularly well-known, after all, for his
aphorism that the “[l]ife of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience.”348 His comments in Missouri v. Holland,349 which I have
suggested provides a helpful introduction to constitutional historicism as an
interpretive method, also point in the same direction.350 However, it must
be noted that Holmes never commented on the specific issue of whether the
traditions that should be considered when determining what counts as a
liberty interest under substantive due process can be dynamic or whether
instead the only relevant traditions are those that are unchanged from the
time of ratification. It is possible, then, that Holmes would have considered
tradition as something static, at least for purposes of substantive due
process analysis, in which case fundamental principles would not be
reshaped over time. What is at least clear, though, is that some of
Holmes’s heirs thought otherwise. Justice Harlan, for example, contended
that the tradition with which substantive due process is concerned “is a
living thing,” albeit one that moves by moderate steps carefully taken.351
Justice Frankfurter, an avowed admirer of Holmes,352 was equally definite.
“[T]he concept of due process of law is not final and fixed,” Frankfurter
asserted when writing for the Court in Rochin v. California.353
347. Id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
348. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co.
1923) (1881).
349. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
350. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
351. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
352. See Felix Frankfurter, Twenty Years of Mr. Justice Holmes’s Constitutional
Opinions, 36 HARV. L. REV. 909, 919 (1936) (opining that Justice Holmes’ decisions rose to
the level of statesmanship and that he possessed “the humility of the philosopher and the
imagination of the poet”).
353. 342 U.S. 165, 170 (1952).
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The notion of a dynamic tradition underlying substantive due process, it
must be emphasized, has contended uneasily with the notion of it as static
and unchanging. It is a dynamic conception, however, that provides the
key to understanding the dramatic changes that have occurred in the
judicial doctrine of substantive due process over the last century. Indeed,
the very notion of substantive due process appeared to have been rejected
entirely during the mid-twentieth century,354 only to be revived in a new
guise during the 1970s. In Roe v. Wade,355 the case that inaugurates the
new version of the doctrine, the Court treated privacy as its central category
of analysis.356 Although cases following Roe generally refrained from
using the term “privacy” to describe intimate activity, it is fair to say that
the contemporary Court has employed substantive due process as its chief
tool for protecting a sphere of personal freedom that is defined by the
values of closeness and personal expression.357 The Court has thus
appealed, albeit often implicitly, to a dynamic tradition, one in which a
constellation of rights—at one time those associated with acquisition and
financial arrangements, but now those associated with emotional and
expressive attachments—defines the civil sphere of personal freedom.358
Put differently, the Court can be said to have accepted the regulatory reach
of the New Deal state in economic affairs while at the same time it has
come to question the regulatory reach of the state over expressive life
unrelated to acquisition and financial profit.
The contemporary Court came closest to acknowledging this shift in the
2003 case of Lawrence v. Texas,359 perhaps the most candid historicist
opinion to have been rendered beyond the domain of the Punishments
Clause. At issue in the case was a Texas criminal prosecution against two
consenting adult males for violating a statute that prohibited sexual
relations between members of the same sex.360 Seventeen years before
354. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-82 (1965) (declining to apply
Lochner’s substantive due process analysis in deciding whether married couples have the
right to use contraception).
355. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
356. Id. at 154 (“We therefore conclude that the right of personal privacy includes the
abortion decision . . . .”).
357. See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984) (stating that whether a
particular intimate activity falls into this protected sphere depends upon the size of the
personal relationship, the “degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the
affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the relationship”).
358. See, e.g., William C. Heffernan, Fourth Amendment Privacy Interests, 92 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 15-19 (2001) (analyzing the transition from property- to privacybased analysis within the Fourth Amendment); William C. Heffernan, The Fourth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Remedy, 88 GEO. L.J. 799, 827-42 (2000)
(discussing the implications of a privacy-based analysis of the Fourth Amendment to the
exclusion of evidence).
359. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
360. Id. at 563.
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Lawrence, in Bowers v. Hardwick,361 the Court upheld a statute of
somewhat broader scope against a challenge by a male homosexual
couple.362 Bowers rested on a static conception of substantive due process.
It focused not on the gradual changes that were occurring in state
legislation concerning sexual relations but instead on the fact that most
states had not departed from the proscriptions of sodomy that had been in
place since the time of the founding.363 Lawrence, in contrast, made an
“emerging awareness” of liberty its central concept, thus giving substantial
weight to present developments while still acknowledging a link to the
past.364
In analyzing Lawrence, consider first the thumb that Justice Kennedy’s
opinion for the Court places on the scales of history. Conceding that all
thirteen of the original states criminalized sodomy,365 Kennedy nonetheless
asserted that “‘history and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases
the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.’”366 Important as
the original understandings of liberty may have been, Kennedy maintained
that “our laws and traditions in the past half century are of most relevance
here.”367 Developments since the middle of the twentieth century, he
argued, reveal an “emerging recognition” of gays’ liberty interest in sexual
freedom.368 Although almost all states criminalized sodomy (either through
explicit prohibitions of same-sex relations or through more general
prohibitions covering heterosexual relations)369 at the time the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted, that number had dropped to twenty-five at the
time Bowers was decided.370 In the less than two decades that followed

361. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
362. Id. at 188.
363. See id. at 192-94 (finding that all original thirteen states had banned sodomy and
that twenty-four states and the District of Columbia continued to do so by the time of the
decision). Chief Justice Burger expressed his view that “[t]o hold the act of homosexual
sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside millennia of
moral teaching.” Id. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
364. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
365. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568 (noting that “there is no longstanding history in this
country of laws directed at homosexual conduct as a distinct matter” but also noting that
“[b]eginning in colonial times there were prohibitions of sodomy [in general] derived from
the English criminal laws.”).
366. Id. at 572 (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998)
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
367. Id. at 571-72 (emphasis added).
368. Id. at 572.
369. In Lawrence, the amicus brief for professors of history et al. maintained that Bowers
had erred in treating criminal prohibitions on sodomy in general as evidence of a
longstanding tradition prohibiting same-sex sodomy. Id. at 567-68. The Court responded
that it “need not enter this debate in the attempt to reach a definitive historical judgment.”
Id. at 568. Its “emerging awareness” approach, with its emphasis on gradual change in the
present, made it unnecessary to address directly the claims advanced in the historians’ brief.
370. See infra note 363 and accompanying text.
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Bowers, the number further declined to thirteen.371 Moreover, Kennedy
noted, even within the states still criminalizing sodomy, there had been a
“pattern of nonenforcement”372 that robbed the prohibitions of much of
their force. In particular, Kennedy emphasized, “[l]aws prohibiting
sodomy do not seem to have been enforced against consenting adults acting
in private.”373 Whatever the original understanding of the scope of liberty,
Kennedy maintained that conceptions of its proper boundaries have
changed over the course of the last century. Individual liberty, he implied,
is to be understood not in terms of what it was thought to consist of at the
time of the founding but in terms of its trajectory from then to the present.
It is because Kennedy gave greater weight to the present than to the past
that Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Lawrence appears to argue at
cross-purposes with Kennedy’s line of reasoning rather than to engage it
directly. Scalia took a static view of the tradition of criminalizing
sodomy.374 His position cannot be classified as fully originalist, for an
originalist account of substantive due process (were it to accept the notion
at all) must focus exclusively on understandings that prevailed at the time
constitutional provisions were adopted. Scalia, in contrast, was prepared to
consider pre- and post-adoption data. For example, he noted sodomy
prosecutions during the colonial era.375 He also noted similar prosecutions
during the period 1880-1995.376 Trends within this latter period (i.e.
weakening disapproval of homosexuality) apparently were of no interest to
him, however, for he spoke simply of “our long national tradition
criminalizing homosexual sodomy.”377 Whether he would ever concede
that post-adoption trends can alter a long national tradition is by no means
clear. What can be said is that he did not think of the data drawn from the
preceding half-century as sufficient to establish an alteration of the nation’s
tradition. On Scalia’s account, Lawrence thus amounts to a radical break
with the past.
But does it? The answer to this depends on one’s assessment of the
Court’s transformation of the tradition of individual liberty. If one were to
view personal liberty outside the sphere of civic engagement in the

371. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573 (detailing that of the thirteen states that continued to
enforce their sodomy laws at the time of Lawrence, four of them “[enforced] their laws only
against homosexual conduct”).
372. Id.
373. Id. at 569.
374. Id. at 596 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that “the only relevant point” is that
homosexual sodomy was criminalized during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries).
375. See id. at 596 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the original thirteen states
prohibited sodomy).
376. See id. at 597 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that there have been 203 reported
prosecutions for adult, consensual sodomy between 1880-1995).
377. Id. at 596 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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concrete terms employed by the ratifiers—as a bundle of rights associated
with the acquisition of property—then Lawrence and the many cases that
make expressive relationships the object of special solicitude surely mark a
deep break with the past. Kennedy’s Lawrence opinion suggests a different
approach, however, one that connects the present to the past by drawing on
the concept of an emerging awareness of the possibilities of liberty.
Kennedy asserted:
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment, known the components of
liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific.
They did not presume to have this insight. They knew times can bind us
to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought
necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution
endures, persons in every generation can invoke the principles in their
own search for greater freedom.378

An appeal of this kind to the ratifiers of the due process clause certainly
stands as an attempt to link past to present, but of course it does so by
suggesting, in a manner consistent with Holmes’ Holland opinion, that the
constitutional text simply charted a direction, one whose details are
properly clarified by later generations. To justify the change of direction,
Kennedy would, I think, have had to mention both the alteration of
substantive due process from economic to noneconomic liberty and also the
background of egalitarianism in which this alteration occurred. It is this
egalitarian background that provides the rationale for the alteration.
Although the right to enter into contracts may be open to all, a formal
opportunity of this kind can substantially skew the distribution of wealth.
Egalitarian liberalism of the New Deal era and beyond is grounded in a
rejection of the legal formalism associated with freedom of contract. But
this egalitarianism adds another dimension to liberty, one that emphasizes
the possibility that all persons—male and female, gay and straight—may
form expressive ties free of government interference, thus establishing a
sphere of civil society that stands as a buffer against the government but
that is also open to all on roughly equal terms. On this account, Kennedy’s
reference to the “manifold possibilities” of individual liberty is best
understood in terms that affirm but alter the ratifiers’ approach to civil
society. Where they thought of a strong commitment to property rights as
essential to protecting the civil sphere, the modern Court has accorded less
importance to these but has substituted, in light of the egalitarianism of
current liberalism, a strong commitment to rights of expressive association.
A historicist would defend this as a modification of tradition that

378. Id. at 578-79.
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nonetheless maintains fidelity to the past.
IV. A QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY
But is it legitimate for the Court to modify doctrine in the ways just
outlined? Constitutional historicism is certainly plausible. It is internally
consistent. Arguably, it provides an attractive answer to the question of
how to interpret chronically vague provisions of the text. However, none
of these points establishes its legitimacy. That is, even if one were to
accept all the arguments just advanced, they would not be sufficient to
establish that judges employing historicism act properly when adopting it
as an interpretive method. Originalists in particular have questioned the
methods I have classified as historicist.379 The results of historicism—
curtailment of the death penalty, extension of women’s rights, acceptance
of gays, diminished protection for property rights—so readily suit the
agenda of today’s liberals that it is surely appropriate to ask whether, as a
matter of constitutional theory, historicism can generate a rationale that
explains why decisions reached according to it are binding on other actors
in the political system.
My answer in this section is that it can, or at least, that it can produce a
more compelling rationale for legitimacy than does originalism. In
advancing this argument, I consider, in increasing order of stringency, three
different criteria of constitutional legitimacy. The least demanding
standard is one of impersonal judgment, an issue of considerable
importance in this context given the possible charge that historicism
amounts to disguised liberal politics. The intermediate standard involves
coherence, in particular the coherence of the decisions under a given
interpretive method. The most stringent involves jurisprudential issues
about the nature of law itself; in particular, the claim that historicism
departs from shared understandings of what it means to interpret a legally
binding text. Historicism, I contend, offers a satisfactory response to all
three challenges. It is not without its flaws. The canons of legality are
sufficiently wide-ranging to insure that some features of historicism seem
mistaken. However, historicism should not be judged in isolation. What
matters is the acceptability of a method by comparison with the
competition and on this score historicism is indeed satisfactory.

379. Though not using the term “historicism,” Justice Scalia caustically challenged the
application of its method in Atkins, maintaining that, despite the majority’s invocation of
society’s standards of decency, in the end “it is the feelings and intuitions of a majority of
the Justices that count[ed]” in resolving the case. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 348
(2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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A. The Least Stringent Test: A Demand for Impersonal Judgment
A minimum requirement of legitimacy for a judicial decision is that it be
rendered according to impersonal criteria; that it not, in other words, be
infected by a judge’s personal preferences. John Marshall’s flat assertion
that “[j]udicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to
the will of the Judge”380 is belied by the facts: there are many instances in
which it appears that the result a court has reached conforms strongly to the
ideological preferences of its members. Indeed, numerous Holmes dissents
were predicated on exactly this premise. This is the significance of his
assertion in his Lochner dissent that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment does not
enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.”381 He made a similar point,
though less pithily, twenty-five years later when he stated that
[a]s the [liberty of contract] decisions now stand I see hardly any limit
but the sky to the invalidating of . . . [legislation] if . . . [it] happen[s] to
strike a majority of this Court as for any reason undesirable. I cannot
believe that the [Fourteenth] Amendment was intended to give us carte
blanche to embody our economic and moral beliefs in its prohibitions.382

Holmes’ comments were directed at a Court majority that consistently
reached results pleasing to conservatives. Today, the disguised politics
charge is more frequently advanced against Court majorities that favor
liberal results. To determine whether the charge is fair, one must ask two
questions: first, whether the method a judge uses allows for the injection of
personal preference and second whether such a method was selected
because it makes possible the furtherance of her policy goals even if it can
be applied without injecting her personal preferences. It is the first
question that is critical to the minimum condition of legitimacy and the
answer to it must be that historicism can, when properly employed, be
applied without reference to personal preference. A historicist judge, I
have suggested, asks whether an asserted constitutional value is rooted in
original understandings and whether there has been a widespread, longstanding change in settled convictions that either enlarges on or transforms
that value. In applying this framework, a judge ratifies change; she does
not impose it. Needless to say, a judge can misapply the method and so
further her policy preferences. Indeed, I have noted that Atkins can perhaps
be characterized as an instance of this.383 However, as I have also noted,
originalism carries with it the same danger of manipulability. Scalia’s
selective analysis of the eighteenth century history of the Punishments
Clause in Harmelin can also arguably be characterized as an exercise of
380.
381.
382.
383.

Osborn v. U.S. Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866 (1824).
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595 (1930) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 259-261 and accompanying text.
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judicial will.384 What is clear, though, is that each method, when honestly
applied, can lead a judge to reach conclusions that do not suit her policy
agenda. A liberal judge employing historicist criteria will have to conclude
that the death penalty is compatible with contemporary standards of
decency. A conservative judge employing originalism will have to exclude
compelled confessions of guilt despite their probative value. Each method
thus has the potential for impersonal application.
But what if one were to advance a different claim? What if one were to
argue that the historicist method is appealing to liberals because its results
usually, though concededly not always, comport with the policy agenda of
the moderate left? On this account, it is the method in general, not its
potential for impersonal application in particular cases, that is open to
challenge for partisanship. The point is surely worth considering, but it is
hard to see why it should be viewed as decisive. Surely a direct parallel
with originalism is discernible in this context, for originalists are generally
conservative and they can also be said to have adopted a methodology that
suits their policy agenda. But to make this point, whether about historicists
or originalists, is to engage in unsupportable assertion. Exactly why
someone adopts a complex theory is a matter for endless speculation; it is
not something that can be established with precision. Assertions advanced
along these lines are reductionist at best; at their worst, they are simply
implausible.385 It is better, then, to concentrate on the simpler question of
whether the method selected is capable of impersonal application. On this
point, historicism is acceptable, but so too is originalism.
B. A Stricter Criterion: Achieving Coherence within Constitutional
Doctrine
The same cannot be said for the second test. Here, historicism appears
preferable to originalism, though for reasons that do nothing to establish
historicism’s inherent superiority. In considering methods of constitutional
interpretation, one criterion to consider is how well a given method
accounts for results currently reached by the courts. An effort to account
for present practice is often relevant to normative inquiry. In thinking
about ethical theory, for example, it is important to ask how extensively a
given theory requires rejection of present practices. A reason commonly
384. See supra notes 72-93 and accompanying text.
385. Justice Scalia, for example, has sometimes reached conclusions appealing to
liberals. See, e.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987) (holding that the “plain view
doctrine” does not apply where the police lack probable cause to believe that an item has
evidentiary value or is contraband); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding that
the use of thermal-imaging devices directed at private homes constitutes a search under the
Fourth Amendment). On the other hand, Justice Stevens, who often reaches conclusions
that appeal to liberals, dissented in Kyllo. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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advanced against utilitarianism is that it fails to account for practices and
principles that respect individuals rather than collective aggregations.386 In
like manner, a reason for rejecting an interpretive method in constitutional
law is that it requires repudiation of large bodies of doctrine. We can call
this a “bottom-up” (as opposed to a “top-down”) approach to normative
reasoning.387 “Top-down” approaches identify a standard and classify
practices in light of their consistency with the standard selected.388
“Bottom-up” approaches, in contrast, are grounded in the premise that
current practices are entitled to initial respect, though on reflection it may
turn out that one cluster of practices should be rejected because of their
inconsistency with other clusters.389
When viewed in this light, originalism must be classified as deeply
problematic. Indeed, originalists themselves have admitted as much.
Henry Monaghan, who at one time commented sympathetically on
originalism,390 has insisted on this concession. He stated that
no acceptable version of original understanding theory, can yield a
convincing descriptive account of the major features of our
“Bicentennial Constitution”: nontextual guarantees of civil liberties; a
powerful, presidentially centered national government; a huge
administrative apparatus; and national responsibility for what had long
been conceived of either as local responsibilities or as not the
responsibility of government at all.391

386. See MARK TIMMONS, MORAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 131-34 (2002)
(demonstrating a conflict between utilitarianism and moral theory with several examples of
situations where the utilitarian approach would benefit a greater number of people, but
would result in an immoral outcome for an individual) (on file with the American University
Law Review).
387. See generally Richard A. Posner, Legal Reasoning From the Top Down and From
the Bottom Up: The Question of Unenumerated Constitutional Rights, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
433 (1992) (defining top-down and bottom-up legal reasoning and evaluating the strengths
and limitations of both approaches in interpreting unenumerated rights in the U.S.
Constitution).
388. See id. at 433 (
In top-down reasoning, the judge or other legal analyst invents or adopts a theory
about an area of law—perhaps about all law—and uses it to organize, criticize,
accept or reject, explain or explain away, distinguish or amplify the existing
decisions to make them conform to the theory and generate an outcome in each
new case as it arises that will be consistent with the theory and with the canonical
cases, that is, the cases accepted or rejected as authoritative within the theory.
).
389. See id. (“In bottom-up reasoning, which encompasses such familiar lawyers’
techniques as ‘plain meaning’ and ‘reasoning by analogy,’ one starts with the words of a
statute or other enactment, or with a case or a mass of cases, and moves from there—but
doesn’t move far . . . .”).
390. See Monaghan, supra note 64, at 360 (“I write from the perhaps ‘puerile’ bias that
original intent is the proper mode of ascertaining constitutional meaning, although important
concessions must now be made to the claims of stare decisis.”).
391. Monaghan, supra note 188, at 739.
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Originalists have not only conceded that their method fails to account for
the key components of modern constitutional doctrine. They have made
the further concession that the Court’s departures from original
understandings should not be overruled. For example, Robert Bork has
justified this by focusing on the expectations that have developed with
respect to nonoriginalist decisions. All kinds of expectations and
institutions have arisen around nonoriginalist jurisprudence, he remarked
during his confirmation hearings.392 “[T]oo many expectations have
clustered, for . . . [these decisions] to be overruled.”393 Justice Scalia, in
contrast, has advanced a rationale for accepting nonorignalist decisions that
is more tactical in nature. “The demand that originalists alone ‘be true to
their lights’ and forswear stare decisis,” he stated, “is essentially a demand
that they alone render their methodology so disruptive of the established
state of things that it will be useful only as an academic exercise and not as
a workable prescription for judicial governance.”394
In this instance, Bork’s rationale carries more weight than does Scalia’s.
The issue here is not tactical; it does not center on unilateral disarmament.
Rather, attention must be focused on the extent to which adoption of an
interpretive method will undermine the social and political order that has
developed in response to judicial opinions. Scalia concedes this point
implicitly with his reference to disruption of the established state of things,
but Bork faces it more forthrightly by acknowledging the importance of
expectations engendered by departures from originalism.395 The choice
confronting originalists is thus a stark one. They can advocate their method
only at the expense of upsetting expectations engendered by the past; or
they can concede the value of stare decisis, declare that originalism should
be applied only for future decisions, and so accept the prospect of a deep
incoherence between past and future constitutional doctrine. It is hardly
surprising that most originalists have opted for the latter course; rejection
of stare decisis would destabilize virtually every feature of the current
order.396 But a maxim of “go forth and sin no more” is only slightly more
appealing. In adopting it, a person accepts the force of precedent only to
jeopardize the coherence of constitutional law. A “sin no more” approach
392. Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 405 (1987)
[hereinafter Nomination], quoted in PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 98
(1991).
393. Nomination, supra note 392, at 465, quoted in BOBBITT, supra note 392, at 99.
394. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
139 (1997).
395. Nomination, supra note 392, at 465, quoted in BOBBITT, supra note 392, at 99.
396. See id. (noting key doctrinal areas in which nonoriginalism prevails that be
overruled—among them, cases dealing with the Commerce Clause, the Equal Protection
Clause, and the First Amendment).
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requires a peculiar kind of line-drawing for virtually every type of doctrine.
The point in time at which originalism was adopted would become the
decisive criterion for analysis, a criterion that itself could be quite
destabilizing and that would tend to cast doubt on the legitimacy of
constitutional decision making both before and after its adoption.
It is because originalism is intended as a rebuke to the current approach
to constitutional law that this problem of coherence arises. None of the
points just made establishes the intrinsic superiority of historicism as an
interpretive method. Rather, they remind us that the development of
constitutional doctrine is an ongoing process and that adoption of a
program of radical reform will necessarily disrupt that process. A
historicist can perhaps take this a step further, though this extension of the
historicist position cannot be said to establish conclusively that its
interpretive method should be preferred. The historicist could contend that
because practice has tended to conform to her interpretive approach, this
stands as a sound reason to adopt her approach. Normative theories
(Savonarola frameworks, one might call them)397 that aim at root and
branch reform severely undervalue the extent to which human practices are
informed by sensible strategies for the prudent management of human
affairs. On this analysis, a framework that accounts for how judges
actually decide cases is entitled to substantially more respect than one that
rebukes them for their ways.
C. Raising the Bar Further: Constitutional Interpretation
as a Problem in Legal Theory
This of course is merely an argument from prudence. An originalist can
properly maintain that it sidesteps the theoretical challenge posed by her
approach—that because practice diverges from what theory requires, theory
should prevail. Originalists have frequently asserted that their framework’s
strength is to be found in its conformity to broadly accepted accounts of the
nature of legal reasoning. Richard Kay, for example, stated that the
ratifiers’ understandings matter because “the force of law derives from the
authority of the lawmaker.”398 Robert Bork contended that “[i]f the
Constitution is law, then presumably its meaning, like that of all other law,
is the meaning the lawmakers were understood to have intended.”399 And
Lino Graglia asserted that “[a]n entirely sufficient reason for originalism, is

397. See THE NEW CENTURY ITALIAN RENAISSANCE ENCYCLOPEDIA 845-50 (Catherine B.
Avery ed., 1972)(describing Girolamo Savonarola as a political and religious reformer who
sought to rid Florence of its corruption and vanity by ordering the collection of worldly
goods and burning them in a bonfire on the Piazza della Sinoria).
398. Kay, supra note 62, at 233.
399. BORK, supra note 61, at 145.
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that interpreting a document means to attempt to discern the intent of the
author . . . .”400
Clearly, these assertions vary in their generality. At their core, however,
all are grounded in two positivist premises: first, that the Constitution is
law because it is the product of the will of the sovereign people, and second
that its status as law means that it must be interpreted in light of the
understandings of those who created it. If legal interpretation were so
straightforward, then of course originalism would have to be classified as
theoretically sound. This, however, is an issue on which simplicity is
profoundly unhelpful. To understand why, consider the implication of all
the originalist formulations just quoted: that the numerous judicial
interpretations that have departed from ratifiers’ understandings are not
law. Robert Bork has put the point bluntly, characterizing decisions such
as Roe v. Wade401 as “unconstitutional” because they depart from original
understandings of the document’s meaning.402 But surely this is an
implausible account of the nature of law. It may be desirable to interpret
written laws according to their enactors’ understandings, but to suggest that
interpretations that do not employ this approach lack the force of law is to
fail to come to terms with the meaning of the term “law.”
Indeed, only a moment’s reflection is needed to understand that
originalism relies on a highly contested version of positivism to reach its
conclusions about the interpretive method courts should employ. On
originalism’s account, the Constitution is law because of an act of will that
continues to be binding today. But if, as positivists claim, law is a social
fact,403 then surely what counts as law is not what people did in the past but
what people accept as authoritative today. Kent Greenawalt’s application
of H.L.A. Hart’s notion of a rule of recognition underscores this point.
Rather than suggest that the rule of recognition in American constitutional
law is that the ratifiers’ understandings determine the meaning of the text,
Greenawalt has captured contemporary practice far more accurately by
stating that “[o]n matters not clear from the text, the prevailing standards of
interpretation used by the Supreme Court determine what the Constitution

400. Lino A. Graglia, “Interpreting” the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 1019, 1024 (1992).
401. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
402. See Hearings on a Bill to Provide That Human Life Shall Be Deemed to Exist from
Conception, Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 310 (1981) (testimony
of Robert Bork) (“I am convinced, as I think most legal scholars are, that Roe v. Wade is
itself an unconstitutional decision, a serious and wholly unjustifiable judicial usurpation of
state legislative authority.”), quoted in ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: HOW THE
BORK NOMINATION SHOOK AMERICA 92 (1989).
403. See Jules L. Coleman, Incorporationism, Conventionality and the Practical
Difference Thesis, 4 LEGAL THEORY 381, 395 (1998) (“The distinctive feature of legal
positivism is that it attempts to explain law in terms of social facts.”).
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means . . . .”404 Were it not for the efforts of originalists to place
themselves under the banner of legal positivism, Greenawalt’s point would
seem too obvious to be worth making. It has to be made, however, once
the originalist challenge is advanced, for it is essential to understand that
originalism does not account for the social fact of widespread acceptance of
Supreme Court decisions that depart from originalist methods of
interpretation.405 As Hart himself noted, when courts decide difficult
constitutional questions, “they get their authority to decide them accepted
after the questions have arisen and the decision has been given.”406 In this
context, acceptance of judicial authority does not depend on a protocol for
decision making that is traceable to ratifiers’ understandings. Rather, as
Hart put it, “all that succeeds is success.”407
In responding to this, an originalist might maintain that even if decisions
employing historicism can properly be characterized as having legal force,
if only because they are widely accepted (“all that succeeds is success”),
they are nonetheless illegitimate as a matter of democratic political theory.
This claim, it should be noted, relies not on a proposition about what counts
as law but rather one about what should be counted as law in a polity that
values democratic decision making. Arguing in this vein, Michael
McConnell, for example, has maintained that “rule by judges is
objectionable in this society because it is inconsistent with the principles of
self-government.”408 And when is it permissible for judges to exercise
authority under the Constitution? Only when the people have consented to
this.
As Robert Bork put it, “[s]ociety consents to be ruled
undemocratically within defined areas by certain enduring principles
believed to be stated in, and placed beyond the reach of majorities by, the
Constitution.”409 The consent of “we the people,” in other words,
legitimates judicial invocation of the Constitution against democratic
majorities—provided, of course, courts draw on the understandings of
those who engaged in original acts of constitutional lawmaking.
This is surely the strongest argument that can be advanced on behalf of
originalism, focusing as it does on the notion of consent to judicial
authority within a democratic polity. The difficulty with it is to be found in
404. Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REV.
621, 659 (1987).
405. See generally MUIR, supra note 8, at 111-41 (detailing the attitude change of a
specific community in the wake of the Court’s school prayer decisions where a nonseparatist school board and community eventually accepted a ban on prayer in the schools).
406. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 149 (1961).
407. Id.
408. Michael W. McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in Transforming Moral
Convictions into Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1501, 1538 (1989).
409. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1, 3 (1971).
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its misplaced reliance on the notion of consent. The concept of consent
provides an unassailable foundation for legitimacy in democratic theory.
To establish that people actually agreed to general rules is to establish
conclusively the legitimacy of those rules for the people who have
consented to them.410 Problems arise, however, when actual consent was
given by one person in the name of others (consider the limited franchise
for the ratification conventions of the Constitution) or when actual consent
is given by (some) members of one generation to a set of rules that govern
members of later generations (think of the dead hand problem in American
constitutional theory).411 Notions of tacit or implicit consent are sometimes
invoked to try to explain why those who did not actually assent should
nonetheless treat as legitimate rules that were adopted by others, but these
forms of quasi-consent are clearly less satisfying than actual assent.412
Originalists are confronted with two possibilities when asked about the
sense in which the people have consented to rule by reference to original
understandings. On the one hand, they can claim that people tacitly
consent to the Constitution on originalist grounds, but the connection
between the behavior of the public and a specific version of the
Constitution seems obscure indeed.413 On the other hand, they can adopt
the more promising approach of looking for evidence—which, in all
likelihood will be less than conclusive—of the public’s attitude toward
constitutional decision making. Polls are sometimes relevant in this
context. But surely the best evidence of this is to be found in judicial
confirmation hearings, particularly in those that strongly engage the
public’s attention.
Unfortunately, the evidence from these hearings provides little or no
support for the originalist notion of public consent to judicial interpretation

410. See John Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil
Government: Second Treatise on Civil Government, para. 96, in SOCIAL CONTRACT:
ESSAYS BY LOCKE, HUME AND ROUSSEAU 57 (Sir Ernest Barker ed., 1948) (presupposing
actual consent in maintaining that “when any number of men have, by the consent of every
individual, made a community, they have thereby made that community one body, with a
power to act as one body”) (on file with the American University Law Review).
411. See Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1127 (1998) (defining the dead hand problem in constitutional theory
as the concern that modern American society is governed by a Constitution that was drafted
and ratified by a past generation).
412. See Michael Sandel, Justice and the Good, in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 172
(Michael J. Sandel ed., 1984) (defending a notion of implicit consent). Sandel continues:
[L]oyalties and convictions whose moral force consists partly in the fact that living by
them is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are—as
members of the family or community or nation or people, as bearers of this
history, . . . [and which] go beyond the obligations [we] voluntarily incur . . . .
Id.
413. See supra notes 405-407 and accompanying text (describing the public’s acceptance
of nonoriginalist Supreme Court decisions).
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of the Constitution based on ratifiers’ understandings. Indeed, the Bork
hearings point to just the opposite conclusion. Faced with a nominee who
openly endorsed original understandings, there was a groundswell of public
opposition to the method Bork advocated.414 Indeed, in defending Court
decisions that departed from original understandings, senators routinely
invoked the Whig notion of moral progress embedded in Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence to challenge Bork’s interpretive method.415
Needless to say, confirmation hearings provide only a modest glimpse of
the public’s beliefs about the legitimacy of judicial authority. Hearings like
Judge Bork’s almost surely give disproportionate weight to liberal interest
groups;416 in doing so, they actually make it harder to understand public
opinion about constitutional decisions. However, if we focus only on the
limited question of whether confirmation hearings provide evidence of
general consent for the exercise of judicial authority only under original
understandings, the answer is clear: they do not.
D. Evidence of Settled Convictions, Deliberation, and Consent: A
Qualified Defense of the Historicist Method
In thinking about legitimacy, it has been necessary to consider a series of
negative points—that is, we have had to focus on the question of whether
originalism has established the illegitimacy of historicist readings of the
Constitution. To argue that originalism has failed on this score is not, of
course, to demonstrate that it actually is legitimate to read the Constitution
along historicist lines. But refutation has its uses. The negative points just
advanced establish that historicism satisfies the conditions that can
reasonably be established for selecting an interpretive method. But can it
do more? In particular, does it provide a satisfactory account of the notion
of ongoing consent to a legal instrument adopted by generations long since
dead?
We can begin to answer this by considering remarks by Hamilton and
414. See Nomination, supra note 392, at 465 (citing Center for Media Studies statistics
that eighty-nine television news “source statements” over three months were critical of Bork
and only sixteen were supportive while a Louis Harris and Associates national public
opinion poll, with questions somewhat weighted against the nominee, found fifty-nine
percent of those polled were against Bork and twenty-seven percent were supportive of the
nominee), quoted in BOBBITT, supra note 392, at 151-52.
415. See, BRONNER supra note 402, at 217 (statement of Senator Joseph Biden) (“Will
we retreat from our tradition of progress, or will we go forward, ennobling human rights and
human dignity, which is the legacy of our two-century journey as a people?”); id. at 99
(statement of Senator Edward Kennedy) (“President Reagan . . . should not be able to . . .
impose his reactionary vision of the Constitution on the Supreme Court and on the next
generation of Americans.”).
416. See, e.g., id. at 145-87 (analyzing the concerted efforts of liberal interest groups to
derail Judge Bork’s nomination through a media campaign, marketing techniques, and
grassroots mobilization).
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Jefferson about the significance of a written Constitution. In the first
paragraph of the first Federalist, Hamilton asserts that “it seems to have
been reserved to the people of this country . . . to decide the important
question, whether societies of men are really capable . . . of establishing
good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever
destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force.”417
Hamilton appeals here to the standard notion of consent as flowing from
deliberative choice, contrasts this with the presumptive illegitimacy of
government that results from accident and force, and then supposes without
argument that one generation’s choices will be binding on later generations.
A year after Hamilton published his essay, Jefferson questioned this
assumption. In a letter to Madison, Jefferson stated that “[w]e seem not to
have perceived that, by the law of nature, one generation is to another as
one independent nation to another.”418 Calculating that a generation lasts
nineteen years, Jefferson asserted that “the earth belongs always to the
living” and that a written constitution should expire, along with public
debts and many statutes, after a generation.419
But of course the American constitution has not expired: Jefferson’s
vision of generational renewal is as impractical as his notion of an agrarian
nation.420 On the other hand, to note that Hamilton went too far in the other
direction, it should be emphasized that the constitutional doctrines that
have emerged over time are only partly the product of reflection and choice
by the founding generation. An analysis of the Constitution’s enduring
legitimacy must take each of these points into account. It must respond to
Jefferson’s hope that each succeeding generation will consent to the
Constitution. And it can do so only by asking how deliberation and choice
by later generations can influence the development of constitutional
doctrine even as the text remains the same from one generation to another.
To make sense of this intergenerational project, a historicist relies on a
venerable distinction between two types of constitutional provisions: rulelike ones that define with precision how government is to be conducted and
chronically vague ones whose meaning, a historicist would maintain, is
properly modified over time.421 According to a historicist, the legitimacy
417. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 33 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
418. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 5 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 115, 120 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1895).
419. Id. at 121.
420. See William A. Shutkin, Realizing the Promise of New Environmental Law, 33 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 691, 696 (1999) (explaining the rejection of Jefferson’s agrarian vision for
America as the nation experienced industrialization and the growth of cities in the
nineteenth century).
421. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 321 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(delineating two types of constitutional cases that come before the Court: the cases
involving “broad standards of fairness written into the Constitution” that allow for broad
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of rule-like provisions contained in the text is to be found not in the fact
that the ratifiers imposed them by way of an authoritative act but instead in
the framework for ongoing coordination of activity provided by those rules.
Adherence to the Constitution’s rule-like provisions for the conduct of
political life—election of members of Congress,422 the convening of
Congress every year on January 3rd,423 the four-year term of office for
presidents424—provides sufficient evidence of the public’s acceptance of
such provisions as binding law. It is thus ongoing acceptance of a rule as
the basis for coordinated activity that is critical to characterization of it as
legitimate. A historicist can point out that even precise rules can be
ignored. When they are, their legitimacy is placed in doubt, no matter how
lofty their provenance.425
A similar line of reasoning cannot be employed, however, to establish
the legitimacy of historicist interpretations of chronically vague provisions.
Only some of these are used in the process of collective self-government.
Many more interfere with it—prohibiting punishments democratically
decided on, limiting government’s authority to regulate religiously
motivated conduct, overturning rules of search and seizure adopted by
legislative majorities, and so on. A justification for such sweeping
interference hinges on whether there is evidence of deliberation by postratification generations as to the meaning of values suggested by the text.
Once such evidence is discernible, a historicist would maintain, it is proper
for courts to take it into consideration when interpreting the text. In
punishments cases, for example, the Court has examined the work-product
of state legislatures and sentencing juries because these are the deliberative
bodies that can best express changes in public convictions about the proper
scope of punishment.426 The Court has thus not operated as an ongoing
legal interpretation; and the cases involving specific provisions of the Constitution that do
not allow for such interpretation); see also Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co.,
337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (maintaining that “[g]reat concepts
like ‘Commerce . . . among the several States,’ ‘due process of law,’ ‘liberty,’ ‘property’
were purposely left to gather meaning from experience.”).
422. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
423. Id. at amend. XX, § 2.
424. Id. at art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
425. Compare U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (establishing the process for engaging in
legally binding agreements with foreign powers by providing that the president “shall have
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two
thirds of the Senators present concur.”), with Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA
Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 801, 801 (1995) (raising the modern practice of treating
some international agreements, such as NAFTA and the World Trade Organization, as
congressional-executive agreements and enacting them with a simple majority vote of both
chambers of Congress). See generally id. (analyzing and defending the modern
congressional-executive agreement).
426. See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1192-93 (2005) (analyzing state
legislatures’ enactments regarding applicability of capital punishment to juveniles to
determine a national consensus); id. at 1206 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (acknowledging the
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constitutional convention that alters the scope of the Eighth Amendment.
Nor can it be said to have treated legislatures and juries as substitute
conventions for this. They are, however, representative forums for
reflection on values established in the text. Given a widespread pattern of
change in sentencing for a specific type of crime, one can reasonably say,
then, that the American people have altered by means of reflection and
choice their response to the crime. Deliberation of this kind is adequate to
register an enlargement on text-based values.427
And what about transformation? When enlargement alone is at issue, all
that should be required is evidence that registers a widespread change in
settled convictions; there need be no extra requirement of evidence that
those deliberating considered the extent to which the present expanded on
the past. This extra requirement is appropriate for transformation,
however, given the greater degree of alteration that occurs when there is
contraction of one textually prescribed value and enlargement of another.
Expressed more generally, we can say that the more profound the alteration
of constitutional values, the closer should be the approximation to the full
model of deliberation expected of constitutional conventions. Although the
New Deal involved no convention (and, indeed, no amendments), it is
undeniable that public deliberation during the 1930s included reflection on
values that would be lost as a result of a transformation as well as those that
would be gained.428
“reasonable” judgment of state legislatures and capital sentencing juries in assessing a
juvenile defendant’s maturity); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 324 (2002) (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting) (“[T]hese two sources—the work product of legislatures and sentencing
jury determinations—ought to be the sole indicators by which courts ascertain the
contemporary American conceptions of decency for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.”).
427. The deliberation at stake here, it must be emphasized, is national, not international.
It is “we the people” engaged in a less formal version of the deliberations contemplated by
Article V. Because this point is critical to historicism, it is regrettable that recent historicist
opinions of the Court have also cited changes in international understandings of human
rights to justify alterations of domestic constitutional rights. In Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003), Justice Kennedy cited decisions by the European Court of Human Rights in
support of his conclusion about the impressibility of government prohibitions of consensual
sodomy. Id. at 573. And in Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005), he made much of
the fact that by the time the case was decided the United States had become the only country
to permit execution of people committing murder at ages sixteen and seventeen. Id. at 1198.
Neither point is germane to a historicist justification of altering rights. It is the
constitutional understandings of the American people that are critical to historicism, for only
these understandings can provide a warrant for modifying the scope of rights and powers as
originally understood by those ratifying them.
428. See ROBERT JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY xiv (1941)
(summarizing New Deal constitutional doctrine just before his elevation to the Supreme
Court: “What we demanded for our generation was the right consciously to influence the
evolutionary process of constitutional law, as other generations have done. And my
generation has won its fight to make its own impression on the Court’s constitutional
doctrine. It has done so by marshalling the force of public opinion against the old Court
through the court fight, by trying to influence the choice of forward-looking personnel, and,
most of all, by persuasion of the Court itself.”).
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Historicism thus maintains that because the enterprise of selfgovernment makes it imprudent to annul a constitution with the passing of
each generation, interpreters of the text must consider evidence of
deliberation by post-ratification generations concerning values mentioned
in chronically vague portions of the text. This approach allows for ongoing
revision of constitutional doctrine, but it does so in such a way that subtly
favors the past over the present. This is because it calls for judicial
alteration of the scope of a constitutional provision only if there is relevant
evidence of a change in settled convictions. The death penalty provides an
obvious example of the conservative bias implicit in historicism. Capital
punishment remains constitutionally permissible for most types of
homicide;429 it enjoys this status because historicist jurisprudence
establishes a presumption in favor of past values that must be rebutted by
evidence of substantial change in the present (and, for most types of
homicide, no such rebuttal is possible).430 Or to take another example, the
values associated with economic liberties, a historicist could maintain, were
properly defended by the Court during the early twentieth century.431 Only
sustained, self-conscious deliberation of the kind undertaken during the
New Deal could justify the transformation that limited their scope while
correspondingly enlarging protection of non-economic liberties.
On a historicist account, then, deliberation by post-ratification
generations can legitimate altered understandings of the Constitution’s
chronically vague clauses, but the historicist method employs an inherently
conservative preference for the values of past generations when it is
impossible to speak of a changed consensus in the present. Moreover,
historicism offers one further safeguard for its method through its concern
with ongoing, virtual consent to its approach to textual interpretation. The
qualifier “virtual” is necessary here because the most that can be said in
this context is that the public exercises a veto over interpretive methods
through the forum of judicial confirmation hearings. Twice in the
twentieth century (Judge Parker in 1930,432 Judge Bork in 1987),433 the full
Senate actually voted down a presidential nominee for the Supreme Court.

429. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 209, at 319 (suggesting that recent Supreme Court cases
tend to uphold the constitutionality of the death penalty).
430. See supra notes 245-258 and accompanying text (defending O’Connor’s position
and critiquing Goldberg’s).
431. See FOUNDATIONS, supra note 178, at 66 (suggesting that the laissez-faire principles
upheld by the Court in the Lochner era were acceptable at that time despite modern rejection
of those economic values).
432. See Paul A. Freund, Appointment of Justices: Some Historical Perspectives, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1146, 1154 (1988) (noting the Senate’s rejection of Judge Parker by a vote of
forty-one to thirty-nine).
433. See BRONNER, supra note 402, at 327 (citing the Senate’s rejection of Judge Bork’s
nomination on a vote of fifty-eight to forty-two).
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On numerous other occasions, nominees have been subjected to intense
questioning about their methods of reading the Constitution.434 If, as I have
suggested, the historicist method is designed to identify settled convictions
about constitutional values, then confirmation hearings offer a way of
communicating the public’s sense of the basic values that ought to be
enforced through judicial review. Clearly, this amounts to a veto of
candidates who have strayed beyond the range of values enforced at a
given historical moment.435 In a weak sense, it can also be characterized as
a proxy for public consent to the judiciary’s articulation of those values.
Two features of this justification for constitutional historicism merit
special emphasis. First, it should be noted that the virtues I have invoked
in defending historicism—stability in self-governance, promotion of
gradual change, and use of ancillary institutions (the judicial confirmation
process, for instance) to monitor judicial interpretation of the
Constitution—are all associated with the notion of prudence. Although the
Constitution nowhere intimates that its interpreters should reason in terms
of prudence, it is clear that an instrument as critical as the organizing text
of a modern polity ought to be read in light of prudential principles. Not
only is the Constitution not a suicide pact,436 it is also not an instrument
that should be the catalyst for radical experimentation. Historicism’s
particular merit is that it satisfies this condition of prudence, not only in the
methods it provides for extending and, occasionally, transforming
constitutional values but also in its consistency with precedents that have
already been established.
But what about the democratic values that inform the text? It is clear
that historicism provides a justification for rejecting the decisions of
democratic majorities. An important qualification is needed here, however.
434. See generally MARK SILVERSTEIN, JUDICIOUS CHOICES: THE NEW POLITICS OF
SUPREME COURT CONFIRMATIONS (1994) (analyzing the increasing scrutiny accorded
judicial appointees in the preceding fifty years).
435. This point in particular and the historicist method in general have a special bearing
on the unnecessarily stark choice that Larry D. Kramer posits in his critique of judicial
review. “The question Americans must ask themselves,” he writes, “is whether they are
comfortable handing their Constitution over to the forces of aristocracy: whether they . . .
lack[] faith in themselves and their fellow citizens, or whether they are prepared to assume
once again the full responsibilities of self-government.” KRAMER, supra note 168, at 247.
If judicial review is indeed infected with an “aristocratic” (i.e. elitist) bias, then this choice
would have to be confronted. However, if, as I have maintained, historicism is relatively
accurate as a descriptive thesis and desirable normatively and if the judicial selection
process tends to produce individuals responsive to changes in the nation’s fundamental
values, then Kramer’s choice is alarmist and unnecessary. The historicist method insures
that alterations in the nation’s settled convictions will be reflected in doctrine. At the same
time, the institution of judicial review provides a backstop against hasty conclusions about
whether those convictions have in fact become permanent.
436. Contra Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(“There is danger that, if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical
wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.”).
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Properly applied, historicism extinguishes practices that have long been in
decline: the death penalty for rape, criminalization of sodomy, statutes that
stereotype women as helpless creatures, and so on. In this sense, it is a
sheep-dog process of judicial review, one that rounds up stray states and so
creates a uniformity for liberty as it has been reconceived in the
contemporary world. Historicism thus establishes a normative narrative for
American history. It points to the possibility of new understandings of the
nature of individual liberty while noting how these understandings grow
out of the ratifiers’ original values. Needless to say, this is not the only
possible narrative for the nation’s history; far bleaker accounts are possible.
It is, however, the narrative that courts charged with interpreting the
Constitution should propound. Historicism, on this account, holds that
interference with the democratic process is justified to defend the enduring
values that have emerged since the nation’s founding.
CONCLUSION
When Alexander Hamilton suggested in the first Federalist that America
could demonstrate to the world that a society is able to establish its political
framework by reflection and choice rather than by accident and force,437 he
was implicitly invoking an Enlightenment ideal of political science in
which humans can determine their own collective destiny. The central
question that has informed constitutional jurisprudence is how precise the
guidance of the founding generation should be for later ones. A
historicist’s answer to this is that the ratifiers should be understood only to
have established the general direction of political life. It is enough, as
Justice Holmes put it, for the first generation to “create[] an organism”438—
and so to let later generations work out, and modify, the details of what was
originally established.
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence provides a model for understanding
how historicism operates in practice. In speaking of the “evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,”439 the
Court suggests that original understandings of the phrase “cruel and
unusual punishments” provide a starting point that is properly enlarged in
response to more expansive conceptions of what it means to be humane.
The trajectory of doctrinal change is in turn understandable in terms of
widespread and long-lasting changes in settled convictions about the proper
scope of punishment. It is the business of the courts to discern these
changes and to adjust rights incrementally so as to take the changes into
437. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, supra note 417, at 33.
438. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
439. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); see supra notes 89-93 and accompanying
text.
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account. On this analysis, Eighth Amendment rights are properly timebound in nature. Punishments Clause cases are informed by a timeless
concern with cruelty, but they accept the proposition that specific rights
generated by the clause must be informed by a temporal component that
allows for enlargement over time.
In this Article, I have argued that the model provided by Punishments
Clause jurisprudence can, when suitably modified to deal with different
issues, make intelligible a wide range of decisions that have interpreted the
chronically vague clauses of the Constitution. The enlargement of rights
found in Punishments Clause cases is replicated in the Court’s decisions
dealing with speech, equal protection, and assistance of counsel. Indeed,
even when the Court has transformed doctrine by contracting some rights
and expanding related ones, its transformative frameworks are
understandable in terms of a more generalized type of historicism. That is,
changes in settled convictions and deliberation by later generations have
been noted by the Court and have, in time, come to inform modifications of
constitutional doctrine.
Readjustment of this kind is justified, I have argued, in light of a basic
consideration of prudence. Jefferson notwithstanding, it is not possible for
each generation to establish a new constitution. At the same time, it is
essential that the unelected branch of government neither impose its policy
preferences on the country nor engage in guesses about the country’s
fundamental values. Historicism relies on proxies for deliberation and
consent that fall short of what would be needed to establish a new
constitution but that are acceptable for the process of adjustment for an
ongoing constitution. On a historicist account, the more profound the
alteration of an original understanding, the more substantial must be the
proxy for deliberation and consent. Punishments Clause cases provide an
example of a relatively modest proxy. Because these cases are concerned
with the enlargement of doctrine, they are informed by a judicial effort to
discern no more than changes in settled convictions about the nature of
humane punishment. By contrast, cases involving the transformation of
values have necessarily required a more stringent standard. The Court’s
transformation of property and privacy rights doctrine—with the former
being eclipsed while the latter has risen in importance—has, not
surprisingly, proceeded slowly and cautiously.

